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ABSTRACT




The broad objective of the dissertation was to 
rigorously explore the theoretical and empirical status of 
the so-called identity-equivalence decalage (Elkind, 1967) 
in Piaget's conservation problems. To date, the decalage 
issue has centered upon demonstration of the developmental 
precedenee of identity problems— single or within object 
comparison— over equivalence problems--two or between 
object comparison. The hierarchy of difficulty has been 
attributed to the requirement of a relational comparison 
between two distinct stimuli in the latter paradigm.
Additional consideration reveals, however, that such 
a decalage could be a result of a difference in the con­
creteness: of the illusion of inequality, and not neces­
sarily due to the differential number of stimulus objects 
employed in identity and equivalence paradigms. Two 
identity and two equivalence paradigms--each with and with­
out the concrete illusion— are described and used as the 
basis of an experiment to examine the aspects of a decalage(s). 
A proposal made by Elkind (1967) contends that the cognitive 
structure necessary and sufficient to success in the 
standard equivalence task— with concrete illusion —  is a 
compound of that required for an identity task— without 
concrete illusion— plus a syllogistic or transitivity 
deduction. The role of the operatory conservations in 
Piaget's theory of genetic epistemology (TGE) is extensively 
discussed and the Elkind proposal found to be formally 
inconsistent with TGE and, in psychological fact, of doubt­
ful propriety.
Four to six year old subjects were used in the 
experiment which directly contrasted group performances in 
the four conservation paradigms and also allowed for an 
analysis of age effects. A recall cue pertaining to the 
initial quantitative relationship of the stimuli was also 
manipulated as a repeated measure factor. Three modes of 
scoring— dichotomous judgment, judgment plus verbal explana­
tion and Elkind criterion— were employed and each analyzed 
at the nominal (all or none) and interval (continuum of 
conservation) measurement levels via respective non-para- 
metric and parametric statistical methods. Stochastic 
models of fortuitous performance for the judgment and the 
Elkind criterion were prepared and used to qualify, at 
appropriate significance levels, individual and group scores 
as pass or fail.
The results indicate that the decalage upon which 
the Elkind proposal is predicated, is due to the differen­
tial concreteness of the illusion and not to the number of 
stimulus objects. Regardless of the recall cue, the sub­
jects performed equally well in equivalence and identity 
paradigms when the illusion concreteness was equated, and 
scored significantly lower when the illusion was concrete 
and could be directly perceived. At the concrete perceptual
level only a single child passed, and there were no dif­
ferences across age, while in the paradigms where the 
illusion is left to a remembered image of the initial con­
figuration, the older children performed better than the 
younger ones. Regarding conclusions, the three scoring pro­
cedures were highly consistent within and between levels of 
measurement/statistics. For each criterion the parametric 
analyses showed more statistical power, and in general the 
Elkind criterion was the more sensitive measure.
Although the results are interpreted to be commensu­
rate with TGE and somewhat ruinous to the syllogism hypothe­
sis, they do not entirely vitiate it. Perhaps at some other
age range(s) there exists an identity equivalence decalage
even when concreteness is equated, in which event it could be 
that concrete identity plus syllogism is the basis for a con­
crete equivalence solution. This seems, however, to be 
unlikely as the present evidence clearly indicates that, at a 
given level of illusion concreteness, performance in identity
and equivalence conservation paradigms are developmentally 
parallel.
5ECTI0N I
GENERAL N0TI0N5 OF CONSERVATION 
Introduction
As preamble to discussion of some fundamental aspects 
of Piaget's conservation problems, Elkind (1967) aptly com­
mented that "The quantity of literature growing up around 
the conservation problems introduced by Piaget and his col­
leagues (e.g., Piaget, 1952; Piaget & Inhelder, 1962; Piaget, 
Inhelder &. Szeminska, 1 960) testifies to the significance 
which both Piaget and other investigators attach to these 
problems [p. 460]." That the literature up to 1967 is volumi­
nous is evidenced in compendiums due to Flavell(1963), Hunt 
(1961), 5igel (1964), Sigel and Hooper (1968) and Wallach 
(1963).
Critical and extensive recaptiulations of the more 
recent research are not yet abundant but this is not due to 
a dearth of interest in the conservation problems— to wit 
perusal of current journals of human development will attest. 
Notably, the conservation literature of the past five years 
has centered on: 1) ontogeny and training of the conserva­
tion concepts (Brainerd &. Allen, 1971a, b*'J , 2) consonance of 
theoretical and methodological orientations (Brainerd, 1973; 
Hall &, Kingsley, 1 968 ; Limber &. Chiseri, 1974; Smedslund, 
1969), and 3) analysis of the mental operations theoretically
1
2necessary and/or sufficient to solve the problems (Elkind &. 
5choenfeld, 1 972; Northman &. Gruen, 1 970; Schwartz &. Schol- 
nick, 1970).
Although inferences regarding the requisite mental 
operations are tendered, this dissertation is focused upon 
formal and empirical analyses of the standard conservation 
paradigm. A prevalent concern is with the utility of conser­
vation problems to the study of evolving cognitive structure 
in children. The formal analysis is insufficient to deter­
mine the actual state of affairs, or even to establish one 
model as more substantive than the alternatives, but impli­
cations for Piaget's theory of genetic epistemology (TGE) will 
be drawn throughout the text with various degrees of factual 
support.
Standard Conservation Paradigm
Before embarking onto research specifics it is 
desirable to establish what is usually meant by "conserva­
tion problem." Whatever is the particular content (e.g., 
mass, weight, length) of the conservation task, the sequence 
of experimenter manipulations and subject responses is the 
same. The subject is first presented with two concrete 
stimuli, A and B, that are qualitatively and quantitatively 
equivalent, and so judged by the subject. Then one of the 
objects, say B, is transformed to B* in such a manner as to 
vary its configuration but obstensibly not the quantitative 
attribute of interest. That is, A and B* are not
3configuratively equivalent but are still so quantitatively. 
The subject is then asked to judge the specified quantitative 
relationship between A and B*. If he asserts their equality, 
this is said to be a conserving judgment. Whether he is 
considered to have grasped the particular notion of conser­
vation depends on the criteria employed in the experiment 
(e.g., judgment, verbal explanation, multiplicity of trials, 
etc.) The paradigm is symbolized in Figure 1.1,
Time Event Subject Experimenter
t A = B agrees does A = B?
t^  B ~^B* observes change B into B*
^2 B* - A? does B* = A; why?
Fig. 1.1. Standard conservation paradigm.
Conservation Concept
A concise definition of conservation is rather 
elusive but it is often--albeit much too loosely— alluded to 
as that "situation" (Hall &. Kingsley, 1 9 68 ) where a particu­
lar quantitative attribute of an object is invariant across 
certain changes in other attributes of the object. For 
example, the weight of a ball of clay remains the same if it 
is transformed into a sausage shape (and no clay is believed 
to be physically added or taken away). Under this weak and 
rather inadequate definition, especially if the final paren­
thetical clause is omitted, much criticism is levied at
4utilization of conservation tasks to explore the cognitive 
development of children. The ground for this criticism is 
usually couched in what is apparently to be construed as a 
"no-nonsense" position which notes that, in empirical fact, 
the supposed invariant attribute is not necessarily constant 
across the specific, or a host of other possible, qualitative 
transformations. The point is made by Hall and Kingsley 
(1 968 ) :
Typically, experimenters ignore the fact that different 
characteristics do change over different manipulations 
. . . In addition, authors often only ask questions about
a very limited part of the conservation concept, while 
representing the passing or failing of a few questions 
about this same part as being indicative of whether the 
subject has the total concept [p. 196],
Hall and Kingsley presented a table (reproduced in
part here as Table 1.1) which relates certain quantitative
characteristics and the empirical conservational status of
this quantity under specific configurative transformations.
Their argument includes this table of "well known facts" as
testimony or proof that the conservation tasks, and the
implications drawn by Piaget, are at best spurious due to the
empirical vagaries of the quantitative attributes employed
in the problems. They concluded:
"l\lo characteristic conserves over every rearrangement of 
an object. Thus, exhibiting that a child believes that 
shape changes do not alter weight does not mean the 
child has mastered conservation of weight . . .  In other 
words the child learns that each object characteristic 
has its own unique pattern of conservation [p. 190],
Hall and Kingsley are promoting, in lieu of Piaget's 
concept of equilibration, a learning theory explanation for
5TABLE 1.1




Shape Temperature Altitude HorizontalDisplacement




7 ? 7 7
? = conservation depends upon the accuracy of measurement 
and assumptions made.
* = nonmeasurable
6a child's conservation performance that centers on what can 
only be called empirical facts which require sophisticated 
operational definitions. In fact, they have deprived them­
selves a bit, for in Table 1.1 the "conserves" rating for 
weight under shape changes should be replaced by at least a 
The weight of a solid object can, in empirical fact, 
change under a simple shape transformation. The phenomenon 
of sublimation (exactly analogous to evaporation for 
liquids) is that situation which obtains:
transition under suitable conditions directly between 
the vapor and solid state of a substance.
At a given temperature the rate of sublimation, or weight loss
per unit time, is mathematically described by the differential
equation:
d w / ^  = kA(P - pp)
Where: dw/dt = weight loss per unit time, t
A = surface area
P = vapor pressure of the substance, an intensive 
prope rty
pp = partial pressure of the substance in the 
surrounding medium
Thus changing a ball of clay to say a flat disk,
will enlarge the surface area to volume ratio and cause an
accelerated weight loss (i.e., mass transfer from object to
ambience). Actually, that is empirically, even in the
absence of a shape transformation the mere passage of time
will find a change in weight, unless the sublimation process
is at equilibrium (pp = P). A sufficiently sensitive scale
7would detect the change in weight under the transformation, 
just as a sufficiently educated scientist would not need a 
scale to believe in the possible mass transfer.
Evidently, according to the empirical argument, con­
servation of mass or substance should be held in the highest 
disdain because it is essentially unmeasurable or at least 
it depends on which theory of matter is invoked. It is per­
haps edifying to note here that of all the conservation con­
tents mass is conceptually the most abstract, except perhaps 
for number and the least amenable to direct experience or 
empirical verification:
The modern concept of mass, however, in contrast to those 
of temperature, light and force (weight) has no sensory 
counterpart nor does it reveal itself directly in any 
conceivable experiment. It is a construct [Jammer, 1961, 
P- 2].
Yet its conservation (as substance, discontinuous or con­
tinuous quantity) is repeatedly found to be one of the 
earliest acquired by children (Elkind, 1961a, b; Flavell,
1 963 ; Lovell &. Ogilive, 1 960, 1 961 a, b). It is likely that 
this facility is due to the lack of a common empirical defi­
nition or measurement procedure(s) that, in the task, would 
tend to confuse a child and make him slow to recognize and/or 
hesitant to rely upon the logical possibilities of the case 
before him. The net effect of the mitigation of empirical 
hardware probably makes it easier for the child to accept and 
remember (in the face of the configuraiive disparity) the 
intial equality and the identicalness (sameness of substance) 
of the transformed object. Then, minimally encumbered by
8considerations of apparatus, units of measurement and accu­
racy, he can apply whatever logical operations and deduction 
he may possess. Thus from a Piagetian vantage it would seem 
that mass is ideally suited to the purpose of the conserva­
tion task. Whereas, undoubtedly because his purposes as well 
as theoretical foundations are different from Piaget's, the 
hard empiricist finds mass the most inadequate quantity.
Given the facts of the empirical criticism and the 
assurance that conservation is not designed to assess the 
child's notion of mass or force, it is prudent to ask, what 
then is the utility of the conservation concept and paradigm? 
Much of the dissatisfaction expressed by Hall and Kingsley 
and others (Brainerd, 1 973; Hall &, Simpson, 1 968 ) might be 
attributable to their rejection of the intended role of logic 
in conservation and its independence of empirically-defined 
stimuli. A plausible analysis of the logic in the conserva­
tion paradigm is described by 5medslund (1968) as:
A subject is said to possess a notion of conservation if, 
and only if, to 5, the conclusion "A=B'", follows neces­
sarily from the premise, A=B and "nothing is added or 
subtracted whileB is transformed into B*L1968],
With this conceptualization, which is far more commensurate
with Piaget's than is the previous loose definition, the task
is somewhat axiomatic— i.e.: "Things equal to the same
thing (A = B and B* = B) are equal to each other (B* = A)."
If a child, under the above, concludes B# / A it could
logically be due to, for example, the absence of a crucial
premise, a belief in the falsity of one of the premises, or
9an inability to organize-the information into the appropriate 
logical conclusion.
In a footnote, Brainerd (1973) essentially reiterates 
the Hall and Kingsley position and dismisses Smedslund's 
(1968, 1969) invocation of the logical necessity implicit in 
Piagetian tasks because: "Many Piagetian tasks involve only
approximate physical properties of objects about which there 
is no logical necessity at all [p. 175]." There is no ques­
tion that many, perhaps all except number which is entirely 
a logical construction, of the quantitative properties used 
in Piagetian tasks are not invariant over changes in other 
attributes of the object. However, the empirically defined 
and verified equality of quantity before or after the trans­
formation is simply not crucial to the concept of conserva­
tion. It is only important that in the experimental situation 
the child believes and remembers, the initial equivalency of 
the objects and that, as far as the child is concerned, 
nothing was added or substracted during the transformation.
The truth or falsity of the premises and the conclusion is 
moot; i.e., it is the validity of the argument or tautologi­
cal nature of conservation that makes it amenable to infer­
ences upon the cognitive structure extant in the child. The 
importance of the conservation response is that it may be 
indicative of certain mental operations that, in spite of 
contradictory perceptual evidence, lead the child to conclude 
that the amounts are conserved.
1 0
Additional testimony to the confusion on the role of
logic is found in another quote from Brainerd (1973):
For example the cognitive structures of the concrete 
operational level (middle childhood) permit only the 
assimilation of concrete facts while the cognitive 
structures of the formal operational level (adolescence) 
permit the assimilation of purely conjectural informa­
tion [p. 176].
This statement is rather misleading. The essence of concrete­
ness for the concrete operational stage is that the opera­
tions are applicable only to the objects themselves and the 
correspondent actions taken upon them; i.e., the operations 
are insufficiently formalized for abstraction and general 
inference. Flavell (1963) describes the limitation as: "con­
crete operations are concrete, relatively speaking; their 
structuring and organizing activity is oriented towards con­
crete things and events in the immediate present [p. 2Q3]." 
Although the actual construction of the physical concepts 
(e.g., substance, weight, volume) contributes to the hori­
zontal decalage most always found for the respective conserva­
tion tasks, it is primarily attributed to the concrete nature 
of the emerging logical operations, and not to any notion of 
the specificity of hard, as opposed to soft, or abstract 
facts.
At base the conservation problems can all be logically 
dealt with by the same operations and the experimental pro­
cedures for each content are very similar. Often identical 
materials and questioning are used— yet the sequence of under­
standing in children is consistently: number, substance,
11
weight and volume, even if the same objects are used for each 
problem. Furthermore, according to Uzgiris (1964) the con­
servation attainment sequence is apparently the same with any 
material or set of objects although, "an individual1s posi­
tion on the conservation sequence is not constant across 
materials [p. 83a]," presumably due to the evolution and 
differentiation of the operations occurring in various spe­
cific environments. The concreteness then is with regard to 
the mode of application of the logical operations and lack of 
facile transfer from a particular task to another similar one. 
And surely one should not conceive of such concepts as mass, 
weight or number as being altogether or even essentially con­
crete for indeed these concepts are abstractions of physical 
objects, as is any such quantity.
V.
A Stance on the Meaning of Conservation
The most interesting aspect of Piaget's conservation 
problems is that within a defined culture the development of 
conservation, apparently independent of any specific learning 
program, is consistently observed to occur in children of a 
given age group. Depending upon one's tolerance for nuance, 
the word "development" in the preceding sentence might have 
been replaced by construction, invention, acquisition, 
divination and so forth. However vague these synonyms may 
be, the essence in each is clear, conservation is a concept 
that develops within, and in the theory constructed by, the 
child. It is a complex product of thought and experience
1 2
that is not in any way meaningfully characterized by, or 
restricted to, equal weights, masses or volumes of objects.
The behavior of children in the conservation problems 
is indicative of an appeal to logic, that is, the quantities 
should logically conserve and the perceptual data can be—  
conserving children finally believe it is--misleading. The 
mental constructs postulated by TGE to account for conserva­
tion are based in logic, and are categorically different from 
the physically defined stimuli and concepts used to assess 
them. It should always be remembered that the beakers do not 
really contain the same amounts any longer— probably never 
did— because of evaporation, surface tension, subtle spills 
and other empirical facts.
Pursuant to a content-free conservation concept, it 
is suggested that the pre-operational child is something of 
a naive realist or hard empiricist, in that he tends to over­
weight sensory data. For example, he may be aware of the 
possible but if he sees an event that is consistent with 
something he already "knows" or believes to be true, than the 
other possibles no longer exist. Specifically, in the con­
servation problems the child is at first guided by two hypo­
thetical structures that may be characterized as follows:
I. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, things 
(amounts, colors, shapes, etc.) remain invariant.
II. Height is invariably correlated with amount, and taller 
is more.
1 3
Struction, or disposition, I has been observed and 
documented in Piaget and Inhelder (1958) and stated in Piaget 
(1967) as
The study of various forms of nonconservation which we 
are still undertaking shows that they do not result from 
a spontaneous tendency toward change (because the child 
is on the contrary above all a conservationist) but from 
aninitial lack of reversible operations [p. 80].
The well known Frank's experiment reported in Brunner (1964)
is also testimony to the existence of I„ Structure II is
repeatedly observed in the reasons children give for non-
conservation (Miller, Grabowski &. Heldmeyer, 1 973 ) and was
found to be the case in the present study too.
Given the above, a typical conservation trial can be 
portrayed as follows. The child is presented with identical 
beakers, A and B, each filled to the same height, and he 
agrees that the amounts are equal. The experimenter empties 
B into a thinner beaker, B*, as the child observes. Accord­
ing to structure I he expects the amounts to remain the same. 
Upon observing that the liquid in B* is taller than it is in 
A (or was in B) the child is in a perplexing situation. 
Structures I and II are in conflict and the experimenter is 
asking if B* and A have the same amount of liquid. Being an 
empiricist, the pre-operational child resolves the conflict 
through the consonance of structure II and the perceptual 
data. The concrete operational child is however enpowered 
with certain mental operations and ascertains, or justifies 
in some way, that the taller liquid does not have to mean 
more, and concludes the amounts are still equal. It is all
14
the more interesting that these children rather insist that 
the post-transformation equality is a necessary condition.
With respect to the preceding portrayal, which is
intended to be amenable to TGE, the crucial component in the
conservation paradigm itself is the perceptual data. It is
the compound of the percept, and structure I and II that
engenders the cognitive conflict in the child and requires
some additional mental operation--physical operations are
precluded— to resolve the situation in favor of conservation.
A paradigm that did not induce a conflict or that could be
1
solved by direct perceptual of semi-logical means would not 
adequately assess the status of the conservation concept for 
the child or the structure that underlies it.
Reversibility and Conservation
Regarding the role of conservation and the concrete 
operational period an important property of thought is 
reversibility. Simply, a procedure or operation is reversi­
ble if it has a logical inverse. In speaking of activities 
like seriation and 'minimal classification (without inclusion), 
Piaget (1970) notes their semi-logical status as: such
ordering or classifying or setting up of correspondences 
does not involve reversibility so that we cannot as yet speak
1
It should be noted that the volume is a physical 
invariant inthe conservation tasks discussed, and to the 
extent that such volume can be precisely perceived, there is 
a direct perceptual solution to the problem. And should it be 
that children construct the notion of conservation by a selec­
tive attention to this physical invariant, and inattention to 
the variable height and diameter dimensions; then regards con­
servation and reversibility TGE and the present argument are 
somewhat diminished.
of operations, and because of this there are as yet no princi­
ples of quantitative conservation (a divided whole is not 
equal to the previous undivided whole). Whatever else might 
be derived from the above paraphrase, it should be clear that 
without reversibility, TGE expects there is no structure that 
will yield rigorous quantitative conservation.
A formal look at reversibility must be done with 
reference to the modern algebra concept of Groups, to which 
Piaget freely alludes implicitly, and at times quite explic­
itly. It is generally accurate to say that the Group concept 
is a model that Piaget employs to characterize much of the 
essence of cognitive structure. A Group is an abstract sys­
tem (or structure) that consists of clearly defined, albeit 
arbitrarily, elements and a given combinatorial operator that 
can be applied to the elements. For elements a, b, c and
operator *, the nonempty set is said to be a Group if the
fallowing postulates hold (Van Der Waerden, 1953, Curtis,
1963):
Composition. The Rule of combination associates every pair 
of elements with a third element which is also of the set, 
e.g., if a • b = c, then c must be a member of the set. 
Identity. There exists at least one element, i, such that
for any group element a, i • a = a.
Inverse. For each element, a, there exists at least one 
element called the inverse, a', such that a' • a = i. 
Associative law. The sequence of combination is of no conse­
quence, that is, a • (b • c) = (a • b) • c.
1 6
A common example of a group is the set of integers 
under the operator of addition. Any sum of integers yields 
another integer, the identity element is Q since each inte­
ger added to 0 yields that integer, and the inverse of each 
integer exists as the negative of that integer where the 
sum of the inverse and the integer yields □, the identity 
element.
Within the TGE model of thought, reversibility is 
the analog of the inverse property of the group definition. 
Reversibility is often loosely, but not exactly contrary 
to TGE, described as that aspect of a mental process which 
allows for a return to the point of departure. In TGE, it 
is a logical, rather than an action or perception based, 
reversibility that is a harbinger of the concrete operational 
period, and the operations responsible for the development 
of conservation in children are identity and reversibility. 
Reversibility is further divided into inversion/negation 
and reciprocity/compensation.
Evidence that such operations are in fact employed 
in solving conservation tasks is often to be found in the 
verbal explanations given by children in justification of a 
correct judgment. An identity operation is taken to be 
represented by "nothing has been added or taken away," i.e., 
it is both the same exact material and amount. Inversion 
and reciprocity are respectively inferred from, "if this (B*)
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is made back into that (B) it will be the same (amount)" and 
"the difference on one dimension is compensated or made up 
for by the difference on the other."
A number of investigators (Elkind, 1967; Hooper,
1969) have warned against taking explanations too literally 
as indicators of actual modes of solution. The reason for 
this advice centers on the belief that actually children 
(must) eventually resort to a syllogistic argument (if A = B, 
and B = B*, then B* = A) to solve the problem and that iden­
tity is instrumental to arriving at the second premise, B = B*, 
in the argument. Doubtless the verbalizations are not error­
less modes of thought, but I should like to suggest that the 
explanations indicative of reversibility are quite valid, 
while the identity references in the absence of reversibility 
are not necessarily rigorous. Dr more specifically, an 
identity of amounts is really the sought-for conclusion 
whereas reversibility is the operational device from which 
this conclusion can be validly derived.
An identity, resulting in an equation of objects or 
attributes, that is not grounded in perceptual data must be 
logically constructed, and the reader is here reminded that 
the empirical heart of the conservation tasks is that the 
subject is confronted with an illusion of inequality. As the 
two beakers of fluid appear to contain different amounts, 
their identicalness on this attribute is challenged by the 
percept, thus an identity argument is rather insufficient and 
of itself is little more than tautology. Two avenues will be
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taken in support of this notion, first a succinct reference 
to some statements in the TGE literature and then a scrutiny 
of the formal structural model— the Group.
Elkind (1967) noted that Piaget (1952) proposed
reciprocity as the significant concrete operation in the
child's realization that the observed transformation is
irrelevant to the quantity relationship. More recently
Piaget (1968) has modified his position and asserted that at
the operatory level the conservations are based on identity
and reversibility and
that the arguments used to justify the conservations are 
interdependent. For example, identity does not neces­
sarily precede reversibility but results from it implic­
itly or explicitly [p. 99].
It seems that the operations are perceived as an ultimate
complex to be applied as a whole and that the transitional
or less operatory levels can be characterized by discrete
applications of the elements of the whole (Inhelder & Piaget,
1958). A quote from Piaget (1952) commenting on the rigors
of the development of conservation of number helps to clarify
the TGE position on identity:
There certainly is also identity, and the colligated set 
is of necessity identical with its enumerated elements, 
but this identity is the result and not the origin of 
the reversibility, since the essence of thought is irre­
ducible to identity [p. 201 ].
In the Group, the analog of the whole, it is the 
identity element and inverse element that comprise the revers­
ibility concept since the identity element is the product of 
the combination of an element with its inverse. The logical
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operation of reversibility yields the identity element which 
can be viewed as both the result and criterion of reversi­
bility. The point to observe is that the elements of impor­
tance are the identity and inverse, and the concept rever­
sibility incorporates them both via the combinatorial 
operator defined on the Group as a whole. Definitionally 
no inverse element can exist without the identity element 
and reversibility reduces to the definition of the inverse 
element/concept. All this is to say that reversibility is 
this concept, and as it is defined on identity it cannot be 
construed independent of identity. Formally the interdependence 
of reversibility and identity is definitional but as the for­
mer operation is predicated upon the latter it remains to 
be asked in what instances, if any, might identity be more 
primitive or less rigorous than reversibility.
The Group can also be defined where its elements are 
transformations or mapping of a set of objects. Each resul­
tant of such transformations is the respective image of the 
mapped object. For example the identity transformation,
I(x) = x, might be described as a No-Op, or one that maps an 
object, invariantly, upon itself. The image of x under the 
identity transformation is exactly x. In conservation the 
attribute x that is logically invariant is a particular 
quantity while, due to some physical transformation at hand, 
a perceptual configuration is altered. Indeed if the child 
had no intuitive notion of identicalness or the expectation 
that x can be quantitatively invariant, there can be no
2D
conservation, but also with only an identity operation there 
is not logical verification of the expectation, and there­
fore no rigorous conservation.
If the conservation problem is further modeled upon 
the group concept where the general elements are now trans­
formations (T) of objects, or their attributes, we have for 
reversibility T' * T = I, in which T' is the inverse trans­
formation of T. The reversibility operation yields the 
identity or No-Op transformation which when applied to the 
obj”ects leaves them saliently unaltered. In order to con­
serve, the formal problem the child must solve can be repre­
sented as, X • T(x) = x, where X is a variable operation which 
when combined with T(x), the given transformation of the 
object, will render the object (attribute), x, to be unchanged; 
that is, X cancels the transformation T. A set of formal 
transformations (operations) that will logically suffice are 
shown below:
Problem: solve X • T(x) = x, for X.
Solution: I(x) = x identity
T' • T(x) = I(x) reversibility
T' • T(x) = x substitution
Thus, X = T' .
The above corresponds to a group of transformations and the 
variable,X, is the inverse operation, T'.
It may be that the identity operation is more general, 
perhaps fundamental, and therefore likely to precede revers­
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ibility in the developmental sequence. At any rate, cer­
tainly identity is crucial, but insufficient, to conserva­
tion— provided of course that a trivial sufficiency of 
identity is adequately challenged, as it is in the standard 
conservation task. In the usual task the transformation 
results in clear perceptual data that implies x may not have 
prevailed unaltered. With the Group model rigorous conserva­
tion is represented as an isomorphism between the requisite 
cognitive structure and the Group structure. The effective 
mode of solution implied by the model is an inseparable 
compound of identity and reversibility which will be referred 
to as I/R in subsequent chapters.
A final word on how the formal description of reversi­
bility might translate into the less formal operatory notions 
seems appropriate. Inversion /negation is a mode of reversi­
bility that constructs the equality of amounts through a 
reverse transformation which theoretically negates the 
observed transformation. Reciprocity/compensation is per­
haps the more thorough justification in that it also implies 
a decentration. For example, in the continuous quantity 
problem it indicates a recognition that the change in height,
H , is exactly compensated for by the reciprocal change in 
width, W . The inverse transformation of /^H is Zb*W and 
the resultant null transformation, I is the logical product,





The standard conservation paradigm (CE) described in 
5ection 1 assesses the belief in the invariance of a quanti­
tative relation between objects when only one of them is con- 
figuratively transformed. Objects A and B are given as 
equals, then B is transformed to B* and the subject asked to 
directly compare A and B*. There is no allusion to or inter­
rogation on the relation between the (previous) state of B 
and its transformed state, B*. Elkind (1967) has referred 
to the CE paradigm as "conservation of equivalence" in order 
to distinguish it from what he calls "conservation of iden­
tity" which involves a quantitative relation, not for between 
objects, but only within a single object. In this paradigm, 
symbolized as Cl, an object's quantity in the post-transfor- 
mation state is compared with its quantity prior to the 
reconfiguration. Cl is diagrammed in Figure 2.1.
Cl involves no intial comparison between any objects 
and conservation is obtained when a subject, having observed 
only B and its transformation to B*, asserts that the quantity 
has remained the same. Note that in the CE paradigm no 
reference to B vs B* is ever made, although in the event of 
a correct response the experimenter may infer that the subject
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T ime Event 5ub i ect Experimenter
tD
present B observes refers to B
*1
B B* observes change B into B*
t2 ■ B = B* ? does B = B*; why?
Fig. 2.1. Cl paradigm.
T ime Event Subject Experimenter
*0
document B observes marks the liquid levej
B B* observes change B into B*
*2
B = B*? does B = B*; why?
Fig. 2.2. CIC p aradigm.
T ime Event Sub i ect Expe rime nter
tD A = B agrees does A = B?
obscure A from view cover A
B —>B* observes change B into B*
12 B*= A ? does B* = A; why?
Fig. 2.3. CEN paradigm.
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arrived at B = B* enraute to A = B*f or alternatively, that 
B ^ B* was intermediate to an incorrect response.
Another within or singleobject paradigm is possible 
where the original configuration of B is still visible after 
the transformation. This paradigm will be referred to as 
CIC and is diagrammed in Figure 2.2. Procedurally, CIC is 
exactly like Cl except that the configuration of B is made 
concrete and remains visible when the child responds to the 
question on the equality. Of possible theoretical and 
practical importance is that CIC possesses a concrete cue to 
the original shape of B, while in Cl, also a within object 
paradigm, the pre-transformation configuration is left to 
imagery and cannot be viewed directly.
A fourth paradigm, diagrammed in Figure 2.3, involving 
two objects, as in CE, but not a concrete cue to the shape of 
object A will be referred to as CEI\I. The sequence of events 
in CEN is exactly as in CE except that just prior to the 
transformation, object A is obscured from view. Here too, 
the theoretical and practical importance of this modification 
is that the configuration of A is not directly visible when 
the question regarding B* vs A is asked. As in Cl the per­
ceptual disparity between the items being compared must be 
remembered by the child through some mode of imagery.
The four conservation paradigms can be categorized on 
the basis of whether: the post transformation comparison is
between or within object, and the perceptual data for the 
pre-transformation configuration is concrete or left to
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imagery. Table 2.1 displays the distinctions among the 
paradigms.
TABLE 2.1







There are six possible decalages between the four paradigms
taken two at a time, but the two diagonal comparisons are
confounded That is, an observed decalag e could be the
result of the difference on the obj ect o r percept dimension,
or an interaction.
Identity-Equivalence Decalage
It is evident that in all the paradigms there is no 
purely perceptual*means by which a subject could be expected 
to conclude that the quantities conserve (Beilin, 1964; 
Elkind, 1966, 1967). For example, in CE a correct response 
should involve the immediate past experience of having agreed 
that A = B and observed B —► B*. In addition, for a correct 
response, it would be sufficient to recognize that B = B* and
*Except via the volumetric invariant.
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then deduce that B* must equal A too. The reader should 
verify to his satisfaction that a judgment of B = B* enroute 
to a solution of CE is tantamount to a solution of Cl. The 
Cl paradigm can be said to be nested within CE and possibly 
the respective solutions are so related.
Elkind (1967) assumed the solutions are indeed 
nested and proposed that the conservation of identity within 
an object is a logically necessary, but insufficient, con­
dition for CE and what is further needed is the deductive 
argument of the form: if, A = B and B = B*, then B* = A.
In his analysis of an identity-equivalence decalage, Elkind 
based the distinction on the number of stimulus objects in 
the respective tasks and the specific paradigms singled out 
were Cl for identity, and CE for equivalence. It was 
explicitly postulated that in addition to the ability to 
solve Cl, a syllogistic reasoning capacity was necessary for 
solution to CE. The syllogism is a special case of transi­
tivity which is the prime motivation for labelling it here as 
the transitivity-syllogism (T5) operation. Direct conse­
quences of Elkind's proposal are:
1. Cl + T5 = CE.
2. Cl is developmentally prior to CE.
3. T5 is developmentally prior to, or simultaneous with CE.
4. CE is a proper subset of Cl, that is there exist elements
of success in Cl that are not in CE, but all elements of
success in CE are in Cl too.
The inclusion of the possible simultaneity of CE and T5 is
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because the Elkind proposal specifies an identity-equivalence 
decalage with Cl prior to CE, and although he makes it clear 
that TS is a later development than Cl, he requires only that 
CE does not precede T5.
A brief digression on what the paradigms represent 
is in order. Cl, CE, CEN and CIC are intended to strictly 
refer to paradigms and not to cognitive: structure, opera­
tions or processes. The mental constructs are postulated to 
be parcel to a solution of the conservation paradigms but not 
in the least identical with them or, more importantly, the 
behavior(s) they appear to inspire. The solution oriented 
behavior exhibited by a child in the paradigms is taken to be 
a consequence of his application, or not, of the requisite 
cognitive structure. For example, the Cl + T5 = CE equation 
should literally read: the structure necessary to solve Cl
plus the structure necessary to syllogistic deductions (TS) 
are necessary and, other things being controlled, sufficient 
to solve CE. For the sake of efficiency, the paradigm sym­
bols will be used, as in the equation, when what is really 
meant is, "requisite structure for." Little confusion should 
result as it will ordinarily be quite obvious which meaning 
is intended.
Northman and Gruen (1970) elaborated upon Elkind's 
proposal and modeled the CE paradigm as shown in Figure 2.4. 
This model of CE incorporates the components cited by Elkind, 
Cl and TS, and also a recall operation. Northman and Gruen 





Identity of substance and conservation 
of identity of amount, or compensation 
or reversibility
Recall
Transitivity or deduction (TS)
Fig. 2.4. Sequence of steps and mental operations 
in the Equivalence Conservation Task: Northman and Gruen
(1970).
a TS operation is necessary, the recall step is very crucial 
and perhaps a large problem for children of pre- or concrete 
operational age. If the initial premise, A = B, is forgotten 
or perhaps never fully appreciated, the subject is left to 
compare A and B* on perceptual grounds only, regardless of 
his status on B vs B*. In a discussion of CE, Elkind and 
Schoenfeld (1972) stated, "This paradigm makes it clear that 
the conservation task requires a kind of syllogistic rea­
soning [p. 529]." Their rationale, which is taken as an 
implicit emphasis of recall, for the necessity of TS was that 
A could not be judged equal to B* independent of the events 
at tj-j and t^  in the CE paradigm.
Step
1 . A = B
2. B -* B*
3. B = B*
4. A = B
5. B* = A
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Elkind and Schaenfeld (1972) also declared that, 
"identity conservation should precede and be a necessary 
prerequisite to equivalence conservation [p. 529]." If, 
they argued, Cl can be shown to appear earlier than CE in 
childrens' cognitive development, then the missing operation 
for CE must be T 5 . There are a number of premises inherent 
in such logic and in general these have been neither cited 
or doubted by investigators of the decalage. The most cru­
cial, and doubtful, assumption is that there is only one way 
a child can appropriately solve CE. This would be a required 
premise for proposal of Cl plus T5 as both necessary and 
sufficient. A second dif ficu lty involves both theory and 
methodology in that a CI-CE comparison is confounded by object 
and conflict dimensions, thus it would not be clear how these 
two factors contributed to any observed decalage. Thirdly, 
little notice has been made that if Cl plus T5 is found—  
somehow— to actually be necessary and sufficient for CE, then 
this would have marked implications counter to TGE fundamental 
hypotheses on conservation and its importance to assessment 
of concrete operations. It is to this matter that attention 
will next be directed.
An Issue
As a preamble to his proposal, Elkind (1967) noted
that TGE operates under the assumption:
Identity and equivalence conservation are simultaneous 
in time, and that the age of equivalence conservation is 
also the age of identity conservation, so that it is 
legitimate to infer the age of the latter from the age at 
which the farmer is attained [p. 23].
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As stated above there are no inherent contradictions for TGE 
in referring to identity (i.e., within a single object) con­
servation processes while assessing these with an equivalence 
paradigm, whereas the Elkind proposal (Cl + TS = CE) clearly 
implies a contradiction. TGE asserts that identity is not 
sufficient for the quantitative conservations, yet I/R is 
defined on a single object and is postulated to be the basis 
for conservation. Any variance regarding simultaneity of 
development likely centers upon which of the within object 
paradigms would be predicted by TGE to develop in parallel 
with CE. An answer is to be found in a few quotations from 
the Genevan literature.
Usually a solution to a conservation problem is 
attributable to an identity operation if the child justifies 
his judgment with, "nothing has been added or taken away so 
it is the same [Elkind, 1 967]," to wit Piaget (196B ) has 
observed,
The real reason children of this age recognize the con­
servation of substance or weight is not identity (the 
small child is just as capable of seeing that "nothing 
is added or taken away" as is the older child) but the 
possibility of a rigorous return to the point of depar­
ture [ p . 46]. ,
By "rigorous" it is here interpreted that Piaget intends
logical and consistent.
In responding to spme of the work reported in Bruner 
(1 966), much of which employed identity paradigms, the 
Genevans alluded to the irrelevancy of Cl to assessment of 
concrete operations by noting,
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At no time did our procedures mask those aspects of the 
situation that tend to create obstacles to the correct 
solution. Rather the experimental arrangements and pro­
cedures were designed to elicit awareness of the conflict 
(i.e., between anticipation and outcome, or more pro­
foundly, between perceptual pregnance and operational 
necessity) and of its sources, which is one of the pre­
sumed necessary conditions for the transition from a 
limited form of reasoning to the operational systems 
[inhelder, et al., 1966, p. 161].
Translated into the concepts and labels of this dissertation, 
the above means that the child anticipates the equality of 
B and B*, and it is the concrete percept of the apparent 
inequality of A and B* that impells the non-conserving judg­
ment in the pre-operational child and induces (requires) 
application of I/R in the concrete operational child.
□n this matter a final quote from Piaget (1967b) miti­
gates ambiguity surrounding the role of identity itself,
As regards identity, what sets it apart from the concept 
of conservation is that identity is only qualitative and 
can therefore be acquired by the dissociation of a per­
ceptive quality from other perceptive quantities: e.g.,
with liquids if a = color, b = quality of being a liquid 
and c = shape, then abc stays "the same color" for the 
subject because a and b have not changed andonly c is 
modified (conservation however involves quantities that 
are not perceptive, but have to be constructed [p. 533].
Any equation of identity and equivalence conserva­
tion for TGE requires that the conflict be empirically based 
in concrete perceptual data, for which the appropriate within 
object paradigm is CIC and not Cl. Furthermore, previous 
to the current wave of research on the identity-equivalence 
decalage, it had been amply demonstrated that Cl precedes CE 
(Bruner, 1 966; Piaget &. Inhelder, 1 963 ), and it seems doubt­
less that TGE would attribute this to the differential impact
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of the conflict. The conflict is attenuated in Cl since it 
is dependent upon a remembered image of the intial configura­
tion whereas in CE the conflict data is fully visible. This 
is not to say that imagery is entirely incapable of inducing 
a conflict, for both Bruner (1966) and Piaget (1968) have 
reported that recall of the intial level of liquid in B can 
cause the child to renege upon his pre-transformation pre­
diction of equal amounts once the liquid is actually poured 
and he sees the level in B*.
The major difficulty with Cl is that in the absence 
of the hard conflict there is a host of alternative solution 
modes, some more primitive than operational and others 
simply devious. Of the latter kind, memory falsification is 
common and obtains if the child, upon observing a higher level 
of liquid in B*, then assumes, concludes or pointedly fabri­
cates that the liquid was higher in B than it really was. 
However he falsifies the original level, he can then judge 
the amounts equal on the basis of equal heights, and in so 
doing has nicely resolved the conflict by massaging the real 
data to fit his structure. Also, without the visible data, a 
child may forget the initial configuration and simply follow 
his expectation of constancy to reach a correct judgment. 
Another solution could appeal to a non-rigorous global 
identity where the same material implies the same amount. A 
very young or inattentive child might not even realize that 
the heights are different in the first place. A fairly 
advanced solution within TGE is analogous to the Group concept
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of identity for which the transformation, I, is the null or 
No-Op. An identity operation is more likely to suffice in 
the minimal conflict situation but as previously discussed 
it is not characteristic of the increasingly organized struc­
ture of the concrete operational period.
In sum, the Cl task is little more than a test for 
a concept much like object constancy, an ability which 
Piaget says is evidencedat about eighteen months and which 
others, Bower (1966), have declared to be present a good deal 
sooner. An imperceptible quantity is at a higher level of 
abstraction than the continuance of being and sameness nation 
of object constancy, and the quantities used in conservation 
are all beyond the pale of perception. Cl does not provide 
a direct confrontation of possible different amounts and the 
question of equality can be superficially resolved through 
recognition of the sameness of substance, the quantity being 
gratuitously attached as a mindless rider. In this regard, 
the sameness of amount of two simultaneously distinct object 
configurations indeed presents a more formidable problem and 
decreases the probability of solutions grounded in perception 
and semi logic. For TGE the crux is that in the Cl para­
digm no I/R operations need be postulated for a solution, and 
the expected performance of even a pre-operational child is 
to "conserve." If one is intending to assess the cognitive 
status of I/R, Cl is certainly inadequate to the objective.
Should it be that Cl and TS are necessary and, or 
even just, sufficient for CE, then the role of conservation
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and I/R in TGE would require considerable modification.
Reversibility would then be without its primary assessment
task and relegated, at best, to excess theoretical baggage.
The implicit revision of TGE that would be necessitated by
the establishment of the T5 model can be seen in a quote from
Elkind and 5choenfeld (1972),
Identity conservation is not truly quantitative and 
involves only figurative perceptual process (i.e., 
global quant ity judgments comparable to those used when 
a child judges a cluster of 10 pennies as more than a 
cluster of 6 because of the perceptual impression of 
numerosity). Equivalence conservation in contrast, 
requires the deductive processes made possible by concrete 
operations [p. 532].
For TGE the important feature of the concrete opera­
tions evidenced by CE is reversibility. Elkind owns that Cl
1
is perceptually based, requiring no such logical operations, 
and proposes that the harbinger of the concrete operational 
period is a syllogistic reasoning ability (TS). Also, in T5 
model, a CI-CE decalage is predicated upon the different 
number of stimulus objects in the two paradigms and not on 
the differential concreteness of the configural disparity.
The proposal should be interpreted as a radical departure 
from TGE.
Though the Elkind hypothesis implicitly discounts 
the Group model, it is not without precedent and does have
The perceptual base could be a selective attention 
to the volumetric physical invariant in the conservation 
•task. This mode of solution, if it does exist, would be 
much more likely in a paradigm where the initial configura­
tion of the transformed object is no longer visible--CI or 
CEI\I— and the disparity between the heights and diameter left 
to a remembered image.
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some roots in formal logic. Copi (1954) in describing the
identity relation says:
It is intuitively obvious that the relation of identity 
(symbolized by " "I is transitive, symmetrical and 
totally r e f l e x i v e J. . . All of these are immediate
consequences of the definition of identity contained in 
Leibniz's principle of Identity of Indiscernibles; x=y 
if and only if every property of x is a property of y 
and conversely [p. 149].
The identity relation described by Copi is not the identity 
operation, I, previously discussed with reference to TGE and 
the Group concept. The reflexive and symmetrical properties 
may be an intuitively obvious component of the identity 
relation for even young children, but the obviousness of its 
transitivity is certainly doubtful and, in psychological fact, 
not the case at all. Elkind is quite correct if he assumes 
that the young child needs to develop a transitivity opera­
tion and essentially construct it as a property of the above 
identity relation. That is to say, transitivity is not 
obvious.
However, the identity relationship between the 
quantity attribute of B and B*, as it is not directly per­
ceived, must itself be constructed, and cannot be assumed to 
be rigorously extant in a child who simply pronounces B = B* 
in a Cl task. That is, the quantitative identity of B and B* 
needs a logical justification before it can be validly con­
cluded. The way to a logical verification of the quantitative
2
Transitive; for entities A, B, and C, if A = B and 
B = C then A = C. Symmetrical; for entities A, and B if A =
B then B = A. Reflexive; for entity A, it holds that A = A.
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identity relation between B and B*, according to TGE, is 
through operations of I/R. Indeed, given a quantitative 
identity, it may still be necessary to apply a T5 operation 
to solve CE, but it should not be assumed that a child is 
enpowered with the rigor of Leibniz's principle of the 
Identity of Indiscernibles. It must be demonstrated that a 
child is applying an identity relationship to a particular 
abstract property, and the Cl paradigm does not provide for 
this assessment but only for the identicalness of stuff.
A power of the identity relation, once it is estab­
lished between entities and their salient attribute(s ), is 
that we can infer— from a first premise A = B and any other 
proposition (premise) containing the symbol B— as valid con­
clusion any proposition that obtains from replacing an 
instance of B in the second premise by the symbol A. Such 
would be the pattern of a proof of A = B*, via the identity 
relation, from the first premise A = B and the second B = B* 
— the instance of B in the second premise being replaced by 
A to yield the conclusion A = B*. The point is that identi­
ties that are not perceptually based must be logically con­
structed and arrival at the premise B = B* is not a neces­
sity and must be rigorously ascertained by the child through 
some additional logical operation, such as reversibility.
The global identity sufficient to solve Cl that 
Elkind talks of gives the child, but on an a priori basis, 
credit for divining Leibniz's principle whereas TGE would 
require that this powerful notion must be validated through
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less inclusive logical principles. A rather precise analogy 
of the psychological development of cognitive structure and 
a formal development of a logical-mathematical system is 
apparently what Piaget intends, and to that end Cl + TS = CE 
is an ill means.
Past Research on the Identity- 
Equivalence Decalage
Most of the previous investigations have centered on 
within object (identity) vs between object (equivalence) 
conservation tasks. Three studies (Hooper, 1969; Schwartz & 
5cholnick, 1 970; Elkind &. Schoenfeld, 1 972) have found evi­
dence in support of a decalage, while Teets (1968), Northman 
and Gruen (1970) and Murray (1970) found no differential 
success for identity over equivalence problems.
A common feature of all those studies failing to find
the decalage was the use of subjects who were essentially
concrete operational regarding conservation. Elkind and
5choenfeld (1972) accounted for these failuresby noting that,
Identity conservation can be arrived at on the basis of 
pre-operational mental structure, whereas equivalence 
conservation requires both the pre-operational structures 
and the concrete operations that develop at about the 
ages of 6 or 7 . . . .  In other words the differential 
performance should hold for pre-operational children but 
not for concrete operational children [p. 53□].
Although their conclusion regarding differential success is
obviously true, there is some considerable question as to
whether concrete operations in general develop at about the
"age of 6 or 7" or if many of the specific performances in
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the above cited research can be properly called successful.
Schwartz and Scholnick (1970) investigated the role 
of stimulus factors and logical judgment in conservation of 
discontinuous quantity and did find the decalage. Equal 
amounts of candy were compared where the relative diameters 
of two glass containers were identical or different. Within 
each diameter relationship level, three types of judgments 
were employed (direct comparison (CD), Cl and CE) which 
yielded six separate tasks. There were seven distinct tasks 
in all and these were found to form a Guttman scale implying 
that the tasks measure a single process along a continuum of 
difficulty. When the two containers were of different diam­
eter, the order of difficulty was CI4. C E <  CD. The data is 
shown in Table 2.2. CD involved a judgment when both the 
diameter and height of candy in each beaker was different 
(amounts equal) and it was the most difficult task. In CD 
there is no sufficient sensory, immediate post experience or 
cognitive skills (unless one can calculate pyrosities and 
volumes by mere inspection) that provides for a correct 
response, and it was not surprising that the illusion of 
inequality caused most children to respond incorrectly.
A similar direct comparison, CD', where the beakers 
were of different diameters but the candy of equal height in 
each (i.e., unequal amounts) elicited more correct judgments 
(percent passed = 30) than either CE or CD. The CD' task, of 
course, has a logical solution that entails— if not explicitly 
then some more simple variation of— a compensation operation.
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TABLE 2.2
MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE: SCHWARTZ AND
SCHOLNICK (1970)
Task Mean Correct Responses Percent Passes
Cl 2.75 47.5
CD' 2.08 30.0
CE 1 .02 15.0
CD .42 2.5
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The child need not consider the two dimensions (height and 
diameter) simultaneously as variables in CD'--the heights are 
equated. The child can either discount the height or simply 
ignore it, and attend to only the diameter or perceptual bulk 
which is perfectly correlated with amount. It could be 
expected that CD', which involves no transformation and only 
one variable dimension, would also be an easier task than 
Cl but this was not the case. This implies, and is perfectly 
consistent with TEE, that a compensation operation is unneces­
sary for correct performance on Cl. Some previous studies 
(Bruner, 1966; Beilin, 1969) have similarly suggested that 
success on Cl is not necessarily achieved through a compensa­
tion operation but perhaps through less logically sophisticated 
operations (simple identity) coupled with an a priori belief 
that the observed transformation will be irrelevant to the 
quantity.
Elkind and Schoenfeld (1972) found a CI-CE decalage 
in four year old children (mean = 53 months) but no differ­
ences for a six year old group (mean = 75 months). The two 
samples of four and six year olds were tested in a repeated 
measures design across Cl and CE for conservation of number, 
continuous quantity, mass and length. The resultant age by 
paradigm interaction was as expected since the older group 
performed equally well in the two paradigms while for the 
four year olds, CE was significantly more difficult than Cl. 
Some very specific statements were made which appear not to 
be warranted by the Elkind and Schoenfeld data and these are
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discussed extensively in Section III.2 on fortuitous conser­
vation. At present it is sufficient to note that the dif­
ferential performances for Cl and CE in the above two studies
could have been due to the presence of the concrete conflict 
or the between object comparison in CE--both of which obsta­
cles are absent in CI--and that such a decalage is entirely 
commensurate with TGE.
The study by Murray (1970) used first and second 
graders in conservation of number problems for Cl and CE.
The procedure incorporated three trials within a paradigm, 
and required only a judgment response where two of three 
correct was scored as pass. If it is assumed that the 
probability of a correct response by chance alone is 1/2 and
the binomial expansion applied to the three trial set, the .
probability of a child scaring exactly two hits is 3/8, and 
that for exactly three hits is 1/8, thus the probability of 
at least two correct is 3/8 + 1/8 = 1/2. Murray did not find 
the decalage but his results are equivocal because the cri­
terion he employed cannot discriminate between a chance or 
comprehension-based performance. Also the subjects were six 
and seven years old and quite possibly able to solve CE for 
number, as Murray's data did indicate.
Most notable among the studies failing to find a 
decalage is that by Northman and Gruen (1970). They used 
second and third graders (mean = 8 years) in a repeated mea­
sures design across paradigms and were mindful of memory 
falsification. The usual CE paradigm was used but the
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identity task was described as,
E presented 5 with a single container of water 5^  
and marked the level of the water on 5] . . .  E
then introduced an empty container, V, which was 
shaped differently from 5-| . 5 observed E pour the
water from S-] into V [p. 4].
The identity paradigm described above is CIC and not Cl. 
Elkind and Schoenfeld (1972) attributed the lack of a deca­
lage to the advanced age of the subjects which implied that 
they would be concrete operational and therefore able to sue 
ceed in both identity and equivalence. The data from North­
man and Gruen is shown in Table 2.3.
Obviously there is no CIC-CE decalage, but more 
importantly there is certainly no concrete operational per­
formance on either task. Northman and Gruen used a dichoto- 
mous judgment criterion, as did Murray (1970), and on any 
given trial within a paradigm the expected frequency of Pass 
= Fail = 1 5 .  The largest chi square value calculated on a 
given performance is for CIC in trial 6 (X = 2.1 , £  4. .20) 
indicating that none of the twelve performances were beyond 
chance expectations. There was neither a decalage or con­
crete operational behavior and the latter finding indicates 
that the reason for the lack of differences between the para 
digms is not due to the advanced development of the subjects 
A more likely explanation for the results is that the per­
formances were not operatory and the lack of differences 
due to the presence of the concrete conflict in both para­
digms. This suggests that a CI-CE decalage should be attrib­
uted to the differential conflict and not to the difference
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TABLE 2.3
THE NUMBER OF SUBJECTS WHO PA55ED OR FAILED EACH KIND 
OF CONSERVATION TASK ON THE SIX TRIALS, NORTHMAN
AND GRUEN (1970)
1 2 3 4 5 6
CIC CE CIC CE CIC CE CIC CE CIC CE CIC CE
Pass 14 16 14 1 B 14 17 16 14 17 15 19 15
Fail 16 14 16 12 16 13 14 16 13 15 11 15
TABLE 2.4
NUMBER OF SUBJECT5 PASSING IN EACH 
CONDITION: HOOPER (1969)
Cl CEN CE
6 years Male 5 1 0
F emale 1 1 0
7 years Male 5 4 4
Female 4 2 3
B years Male 5 5 6
Female 4 3 1
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in the number of stimulus objects in the two paradigms.
Hooper (1969) explored the identity equivalence 
decalage using Cl, CE, and CEN paradigms. The content was 
discontinuous quantity and the criterion was a correct judg­
ment plus adequate verbal explanation on two of three trials. 
CEN was used as an equivalence task that was said to be 
"comparable to the identity conservation task format in 
terms of memory requirements and perceptual cues presented 
to the 5 [p. 237]." Hooper predicted that since the two 
equivalence tasks shared the hypothetical logical deduction 
sequence there would be no differential success between them, 
but as Cl requires no T5 it will be less difficult than CE 
and CEN.
Eighteen males and eighteen females at each of three 
age levels were used: kindergarten (mean = 6 years), first
grade (mean = 7 years) and second grade (mean = 9 years).
There were six subjects of each sex in each paradigm at each 
age level. The number of subjects in each cell who passed 
is shown in Table 2.4.
Collapsing across age levels no difference was found
between CE and CEN, but a significant difference between Cl
2
and the combined equivalence paradigms did result (X = 5.353, 
£  < .05). Although there was no significant paradigm x age 
interaction it was reported that the identity-equivalence 
(combined) decalage was most pronounced at the lower age level 
(X = 8.02, £  < .01). Hooper neglected to report that 
collapsed across age levels the CI-CEN decalage was not
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2significant (X = 3.6, £ .£ .01) nor was it Even significant
2
far the kindergarten children (X = 2.125, £  .20, Yates
correction).
In discounting Hooper's reported findings, Murray 
(1970) remarked that "the differences in number of subjects 
conserving between identity and equivalence conditions were 
quite small [p. 291]." The differences were small but a 
more ruinous criticism is that although, overall and at each 
age, CE and CEN were of comparable difficulty, so too were 
Cl and CEN— as noted above but ignored by Hooper. With such 
results an identity-equivalence decalage cannot be claimed 
because Cl, an identity paradigm, was not more facile than 
CEN, an equivalence paradigm. Furthermore, by the logic of 
transitivity, if CEN = CE, and Cl = CEN, then Cl = CE. None 
the less, statistically it was true that CI< CE (also 
unreported by Hooper) and Cl <£. CEN/CE, which makes for a con­
tradiction and some confusion regards the identity-equivalence 
issue.
Hooper's reasoning was that if there was no decalage 
between CEN and CE, but one between Cl and CEN/CE— and pro­
vided that Cl has all the solution features of CEN except 
the deductive argument--then the CI-CEN/CE decalage must be 
due to the equivalency paradigms' need for the syllogism (T5). 
His argument is predicated upon: the equation of CE and CEN
on syllogism requirements, the equation of Cl and CEN on 
remembered image requirements, and a CI-CEN decalage based 
on the T5 requirement in CEN but not in Cl. The final two
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points in the predication set are of course contradictory» 
the latter predicts a CI-CEN decalage and the former pre­
dicts no such decalage.
The resolution of the contradiction in predicted 
outcomes should come from the experimental results which 
were no CI-CEIM decalage, but a CI-CE decalage, all of which 
indicates that the role of T5 is minimal and the observed 
decalage is due to the differences on the conflict between 
CE and Cl. Hooper concluded otherwise. He reported, no 
decalage for CEN-CE, but one for CI-CEN/CE, and laid this 
difference to a TS requirement for the equivalency para­
digms .
As it was true that no CE-CEN decalage was found —  
these two differ on conflict--and a CI-CEN/CE difference was 
observed, it was not wholly improper to decide that the 
decalage was due to the object difference and commensurate 
TS requirement. But impropriety is avoided only if one ignores 
that also there was no CI-CEN decalage. With this last fact 
of the results there are two conclusions possible--depending 
on which non decalage is emphasized— which renders the find­
ings highly equivocal but rather interesting too.
Formalization of the Study Hypothesis
The identity-equivalence decalage issue has a number 
of components that are not without consequence for TGE. The 
literature of TGE and the research reviewed here suggest that 
the label "identity-equivalence decalage" as it regards within 
vs between object paradigms is fraught with confusion. There
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are four paradigms, two at each level of identity and equiva­
lence, and these pairs can be differentiated according to 
whether the illusion of inequality is based on a concrete 
percept or a remembered image of it. A numbe'r of questions 
pertaining to the general developmental sequence of the para­
digms are apparent. Specifically it should be asked of the 
paradigms:
1. What is the hierarchy of difficulty?
2. What age range(s) pertains to what hierarchy?
3. What aspects of the paradigms contribute to any observed 
hierarchy?
4. What cognitive structure may be sufficient for one para­
digm but not for another?
5. Is one paradigm ability nested within another, e.g.,
Cl + TS = CE?
One aspect of equivalence paradigms that has not been 
explored is the role of recall of the initial equality— not 
configuration. Northman and Gruen (1970) did point out that 
the recall step is parcel to a TS model of CE, in that A = B 
is a crucial premise in the deduction sequence. 5medslund 
(1964, 1969) has often cautioned investigators on the memory 
requirement in the study of mental processes and Piaget (1968) 
in discussing assessment of transitivity has stated: "Finally
he (the child) is asked whether or not A = C, after being 
remind ed of the equalities A = B and B = C [p. 123]."
Although memory is a factor in any problem-solving process, 
it is here considered not to be a unique component of any
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particular mental construct or structure, but a general 
information retrieval process to be used over and over again 
across tasks.
Other things being equal, it is suggested that there 
are essentially three empirical obstacles which, depending 
upon their relative weightings and combinations, will con­
tribute to a hierarchy of difficulty in the conservation 
paradigms. The three factors are: Conflict (Imagery, Con­
crete), Object (Within, Between) and Memory (Recall cue, No 
Recall cue). The Conflict and Object factors are pertinent 
to all the paradigms but the recall strictly involves only 
the Between object cases, since there is no initial rela­
tion to recall for within tasks. A tentative ordinal weight­
ing of difficulty for among obstacles is, Conflict'?’ Object 5 
Memory while that for the respective intra-obstacle com­
parisons is Concrete ?• Imagery, Between 2 Within and, where 
applicable, No Recall ?  Recall.
A developmental sequence of the paradigms based on 
the hypothetical weightings of obstacles is shown in Table
2.5. The Cl and CIC are expected to lag CEN and CE, respec­
tively, because of the Memory requirement in the equivalency 
paradigms. But if the tasks are implemented with the 
assurance that the child does recall A = B’ (i.e., is given a
cue) then the predicted hierarchy is CE = C I C ^CEN = Cl,
where the cut off is based on the Conflict ?” Object and 
Concrete ?  Imagery weightings of obstacles.
49
TABLE 2.5
HYPOTHETICAL DEVELOPMENTAL SEQUENCE OF 
CONSERVATION PARADIGM5
Hierarchy Paradigm Obstacles
Last CE Concrete, Between, Memory
CIC Concrete, Within
CEN Imagery, Between, Memory
First Cl Imagery, Within
Demonstration of the viability of the above develop­
mental sequence is the basic objective of this dissertation. 
Central to the hierarchy is the relative weighting of obsta­
cles and this too is part of the primary objective. Addi­
tional inquires, subsidiary to the hypothetical develop­
mental sequence, pertain to the scoring criterion and espe­
cially to the problem of chance or fortuitious correct per­
formances. The multiplicity of scoring techniques and their 
amenability to estimation of the probability that correct 
solutions could have occurred without comprehension appears 
to have interesting possibilities and is much discussed in 




The Empirical Study 
Basic Design
Ninety-six children from 4.5 to 6.5 years of age 
were selected from a nursery school/kindergarten and day care 
center in the Durham, New Hampshire area. Overall age and 
sex statistics of the sample are shown in Table 3.1.
An objective, largely achieved, in the placement of 
subjectsinto the eight (n = 12) experimental groups was a 
uniform distribution of age and sex. The basic experiment 
was conceived as a four factor (2 x 2 x 2 x 2) design with 
repeated measures on Factor III. The independent variables 
are indicated in Table 3.2 and the cell array with the 
repeated measure factor indicated is shown in Figure 3.1.
The contents employed were, in the conservation paradigms, 
discontinuous quantity (DQ) and continuous quantity (CQ). 
Within each Memory status condition a child successively 
received a DQ and a CQ problem, and there were four trials 
in all. The content was altered on each trial, e.g., one of 
the four possible orderings was: Recall (DQ), Recall (CQ),
No Recall (DQ), No Recall (CQ).
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TABLE 3.1 
AGE AND 5EX DATA FDR THE SAMPLE
T otal Females Males Mean Age Age Range Age Std. Dev.
96 44 52 65.2 mths 33-74 mths 5.91
TABLE 3.2
DESIGNATION OF FACTORS IN THE BASIC DESIGN
Factor Number Name Levels
I Object status (1 ) - Within
(2) = Between
II Conflict status (1 ) = Concrete
(2 ) = Imagery
III Memory status (1 ) = Recall cue
(2) = No Recall cue
IV Sequence of recall (1 ) = Recall first
cue
(2) = Recall second
52
Within Ob i ect Between Obiect
Concrete Imaqe Concrete Imaqe
Recall No Recall No Recall No Recall No
Sequence
1 Group 1 3 5 7
Sequence
2 Group 2 4 6 8
Fig. 3.1. Cell array in the basic design.
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Pretest
Young children do not always have a firm under­
standing of the specificity of relational terms such as 
'more,1 'less' and 'same' (Griffin et al. , 1 967; Hall &. 
Kingsley, 1967). Hence a pretest was employed to gauge the 
childrens' comprehension of these particular quantifiers and 
also to allow the children to became a bit familiar with the 
materials and general mode of comparisons that they would 
encounter in the experimental situations.
Each child had before him three identical cylindrical 
(3" x 3.5") drinking glasses, each containing an obviously 
different amount of yellow water. He was then given a fourth 
identical glass which was previously filled to the inter­
mediate amount and asked to select from the three,in turn and 
with replacement, a glass having the 'same" amount,'more' and 
'less' than his glass. One of the six possible orderings of 
terms was randomly assigned to each subject. The same pro­
cedure was followed for a DQ pretest except glasses were 
filled with short grained raw rice and the order of the terms 
reversed. No deliberate feedback was given but if upon sub­
sequent questioning a child wished to renege on a previous 
response, he was allowed to do so. 5ix questions were asked 
of each child, where zero points were given for an incorrect 
response, and one point for a correct response. The pretest 




Standard materials were utilized for each of the two 
content areas. For between object tasks (CEN, CE) two 
identical cylindrical glasses (2.75" x 4.625") and a third 
taller and slimmer (2.375" x 5.75") one were used. The ratio 
of the former volume to the latter is 1.06 and the gross or 
bulk impressions of 'fullness' for the two recepticles is 
essentially equivalent. This simple control should mitigate 
any tendency to judge an amount different because its con­
tainer has mare or less of its bulk occupied than the other. 
The distances from the top of the glasses to the level of 
material is mathematically equal when the stouter glass is 
filled to 71.3 percent of its height. Some effort was made 
to keep these distances equal as another control against dif­
ferential fullness which might be defined by the child as 
"how close to the top of the glass." 5ince the relative 
volumetric fullness and distance from the top are nearly con­
stant, the salient perceptual cue for the conflict, then, 
should be restricted primarily to discrepancies in height,
i.e., distance from the base.
For DQ the stout glasses were about 10 percent 
(height) filled with small white pea beans or black beans; 
a different color for each memory-status condition. The CQ 
tasks were run with identical glasses and shape relations as 
in DQ, except that red and green colored water was used. 
Different colors were used to provide the child with a pre­
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text for having a second trial on the same content. For 
example, in the l\lo Recall DQ, CQ trials, a child might 
respectively get white beans and red water while in the 
Recall situation he would receive black beans and green water 
respectively. The concrete perceptual cue was eliminated in 
the CEN problems by placing a large cylindrical can over one 
of the stout glasses after the initial comparison and just 
prior to the transformation of the material from the second 
stout glass to the slim one.
The Within Object tasks (Cl, CIC) employed only one 
of the stout glasses and the same slim one as in the Between 
Object conditions. Also the same beans, water and trial 
orderings were used. In order to provide a concrete per­
ceptual cue for the CIC problems the original height of the 
material was marked by placing a rubber band on the stouter 
glass prior to the transformation.
Procedures
The specific procedures for each of the paradigms 
will be outlined in this section. The CE paradigm was run as 
usual except for a slight alteration on certain of the trials 
in order to allow for the modified Elkind scoring technique.
The two stout glasses, A and B, were previously filled to 
the same height and the child asked: "Is there the same amount
of water to drink in this glass (experimenter points to A) as 
there is in this glass?" (experimenter points to B). If the 
child said "no," he was invited to fill the smaller amount
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(his choice) with water from a carafe until he was satisfied 
that the amounts were exactly the same. Then the material 
in glass B was poured into the slim glass (B*) and the child 
asked, "Is there the same amount to drink here (pointing to 
B*) as in this glass (pointing to A), or is there a different 
amount here (pointing to B*) than in here (painting to A)?" 
The phrasing is a bit awkward grammatically, but it is spe­
cific and unambiguous in conjunction with the synchronous 
pointing gestures. After his judgment the child was asked 
"Why do you think so?" If, after an incorrect judgment, the 
child neglected to indicate more or less, he was simply asked, 
"which is more to drink?"
□n the second problem within each Memory condition if 
the child made an incorrect judgment, he was asked, "If I put 
this (point to B*) back into here (point to B), then will 
there be the same amount in here (still pointing to B) as 
here (point to A) or will they be different amounts?" This 
question could have been never, once or twice asked of each 
subject. The CEN paradigm was run in exactly the same manner 
as CE except that object A was covered just before B was 
transformed to B*. In the Recall condition, after the first 
question, the cue was provided by asking the child "do you 
remember that these two glasses (point to A and B) were the 
same amount before I poured?" If the child indicated a lapse 
of memory, he was verbally reminded of the original status.
In the CIC problems the child was shown the pre­
viously filled stout glass (B) and he watched while the
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experimenter placed an elastic band at the height of the 
material. The child was invited to judge the match-up of 
height and elastic. He was also allowed to modify the 
elastic's position if he believed the match to be imprecise. 
Then the experimenter poured the contents of B into the slim 
glass B* and asked, "Is there the same amount to drink here 
(pointing to B*) as there was before (pointing to B), or is 
there a different amount now?" After his judgment, the 
child was asked, "Why do you think so?" Upon an incorrect 
judgment on the second trial within each Memory condition, 
the child was asked, "Will it be the same amount as before if 
I put it back in here (painting to B) or will it be different 
than it was before?" After the transformation and first 
question, the Recall cue was provided by asking the child,
"Do you remember how much was in here (point to B) before?" 
The Cl problems were run just as in CIC except that there was 
no concrete perceptual indicator of the original height of 
materials.
□f course the specific wording of the questions asked 
is something of an ideal that is difficult to realize in 
practice unless a robot device (programmed procedure) is 
employed. One thing in the actual procedure that could be 
controlled was the spoken order of "same" and "different" and 
this was simply alternated such that within subjectseach of 
these terms was uttered first in two of the four problems—  
once in each Memory condition.
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5coring
There is considerable discussion (Braine, 1959, 1964; 
Brainerd, 1973; Gruen, 1966; Limber & Chiseri, 1974; 5meds- 
lund, 1963) as to whether a simple judgment or a judgment 
plus a verbal justification are proper criterion for Piagetian 
and other tasks assessing mental processes. Methodologically 
the importance of incorporating verbal explanations centers 
on its utility as a defense against certain sources of false 
positive and false negative diagnostics. The false negative 
or Type II error can arise because of inattentiveness, mis­
interpretation of the question and a host of common problems 
encountered when assessing cognitive abilities (Smedslund, 
1969). On the other hand, a correct judgment can arise due 
to entirely fortuitous factors (e.g., a procedural bias that 
spawns an irrelevant hypothesis which yields a correct judg­
ment, or simple guessing) or because of theoretically 
important factors. The latter Type I error situation is of 
theoretical import too, and is especially potent for many of 
Piaget's concerns where there are multiple structures— perhaps 
some more primitive than others--postulated within the theory 
that can account for a correct judgment. Imagery solutions, 
rather than deductive solutions, to transitivity problems are 
a good example. Also an explanation can provide insight as 
to the probable solution mechanism employed or what has been 
referred to by Brainerd(1973) as the 'nature' of structure.
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The major argument against the use of verbal explana­
tions is that the judgment plus verbal successes in Piagetian 
tasks are theoretically--and empirically (Gruen, 1965)— a 
proper subset of the judgment-only criterion and thus induc­
tive of false negative diagnostics. This theoretical argu­
ment, most recently fostered by Brainerd (1973), rests on the 
not unreasonable notion that a child might be applying the 
mental operations of interest but simply unable to verbalize 
it; i.e., the appropriate linguistic skills lag the opera­
tional ability.
The choice of criteria is not a mean issue. In his 
analysis of the problem, Gruen (1966) correctly noted that the 
selection should be a function of the theoretical nations 
involved and that verbal explanations appear commensurate 
with TGE whereas the judgment criterion is more amenable to 
theories like that of Bruner (1964, 1966). For the present 
study the preferred criterion is the judgment plus verbal 
criterion although the data will also be analyzed under a 
simple judgment and a modified Elkind criterion. A more 
comprehensive justification for the preference of the verbal 
requirement is presented in Limber and Chiseri (1974).
The explanation criterion was primarily invoked to:
1. Guard against false positive diagnostics due to irrele­
vant cues/hypotheses, response set (it's always the same), 
pure guess, etc.;
2. Guard against false negative diagnostics due to lack of 
attention or comprehension of the question(s);
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3. Indicate the bases of incorrect judgments.
The criterion was very liberal, and generally any logical 
explanation pertinent to the task (e.g., "because 2 + 2 = 4," 
is logical but irrelevant) was regarded as sufficient. The 
verbal rationale offered by a child was transcribed immedi­
ately after each trial,and decisions as to the acceptability 
of the response were independently made later by two judges 
who had no knowledge of the subject's number of correct 
judgments, experimental condition, or personal data.
The inclusion of the explanation criterion was not 
to specifically indicate the "nature" of the underlying 
structure or reveal a rigorous understanding of certain 
principles that support notions of conservation. Rather, the 
verbal response was intended to provide evidence that a 
child's belief in the equality was grounded in principles 
that are relevant to, and logically implicated by his judg­
ment. Given that a correct judgment was made, any of the 
following argument categories were acceptable: compensation/
reciprocity, inversion, previous equality, no additions or 
subtractions, irrelevancy of the observed transformation, 
and identicalness of material.
After each transformation, the child was asked the 
question pertinent to the paradigm. In the judgment scoring 
a correct response received one point and an incorrect 
response zero points. The range of scores for the judgment 
criterion is, then, 0 to 4. On each trial the child was 
asked to give a verbal rationale for his judgment and the
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judgment/explanation scoring -proceeded as follows: incorrect
judgment = 0, correct judgment = 2, acceptable explanation =
2. A subject could earn as many as 4 points per trial, and
the range of scores is 0 to 16.
A modified Elkind criterion was also used, and is 
further discussed in the section on Fortuitious Performance 
but will be briefly previewed here. A correct judgment on 
the conservation question received 3 points. On the second 
trial within each Memory condition, if he had made an incor­
rect judgment, the child was asked to judge the outcome of
pouring B* back into B. If, in CEN or CE, he said that the
two amounts will again be the same or if, in Cl or CIC, he 
declared the amount will be restored to its original status, 
he received 2 points, whereas if he believed the amounts 
would remain different, only 1 point was given. Thus a 
range of 2 to 12 points is possible.
There is an infinity of ways to assign weights to 
the judgment and verbal responses, but in light of the con­
troversy and dearth of research using systematic manipulation 
of scoring procedures, equal weights will be assumed. The 
interval level of measurement implies a "continuum of conser­
vation," and the equal weights in the judgment/explanation 
criterion requires that the distance between an incorrect 
judgment and a correct judgment is equal to the distance 
between a correct judgment and a correct judgment plus expla­
nation.
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All the scoring procedures are of course executed 
simultaneously and each allows the data to be meaningfully 
interpreted at a nominal or interval level of measurement.
If conservation is viewed as an 'all or none' (pass or fail) 
behavior, then a predesignated performance level can be 
applied to each subject and the correspondent classification 
made. The four trial point totals for a pass and the res­
pective significance levels are shown in Table 3.3.
TABLE 3.3
MINIMUM LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE FOR A 







4 correct = 4 points 
4 correct = 16 points 
combination 1 1 points
£  = .0625 
£  <  .0625 
£  £  *125
The probabilities in Table 3.3 are based on the assumption 
that a fortuitous correct judgment on any given trial is 
equally likely as an incorrect judgment and derived from the 
appropriate fortuitous probability function (see Section 
III.2). The resultant data was analyzed with non-parametric 
techniques for the "all or none" approach and by various
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parametric procedures under the "continuum of conservation" 
(interval level data) assumption.
The following two subsections of Methodology, entitled 
Fortuitous Performance and Levels of Measurement, are not 
entirely necessary for an appreciation of the section on 
Results. As the fortuitous models and measurement levels are 
believed to be properly germane to methodology, and cannot be 
adequately discussed without reference to the scoring pro­
cedures used in the experiment, their treatment has been 
deferred to this point in the text. In the next subsection 
the Elkind and Schoenfeld (1972) study is the basis for an 
example of construction and application of a probability 
distribution of fortuitous performance. Subsequent to the 
example, the models for the judgment and Elkind criteria used 
in the present study are derived. The Levels of Measurement 
discussion briefly reviews some of the requirements and 
implications of nominal and interval data.
Fortuitous Performance
In the absence of a spontaneous verbal explanation as 
parcel to the criteria for a correct response, fortuitous 
conservation can be a serious deterrent for the researcher 
who wishes to make inferences beyond his data. Fortuitous 
conservation is intended to represent that situation where a 
child simply guesses or selects— either through whimsy or 
because of cues sporadically engendered by the experimenter—  
an available response which happens to be the correct one.
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Where only simple judgment is employed as the criterion for 
conservation, it would be desirable to have a theoretical 
model of fortuitous conservation to guard against subjects 
being erroneously classified as conservers. For example, if 
the probability of a mindless correct judgment on any given 
task can be judiciously ' estimated, a binomial expansion could 
then be applied to derive a theoretical sampling distribution 
of fortuitous conservation.
At its most rudimentary level the probability of a 
fortuitous correct judgment extant in the population depends 
upon the number of alternative judgments that might be rea­
sonably invoked in the conservation assessment paradigm. A 
first approximation might find that there are three recog­
nizable and mutually exclusive response categories for the 
comparison of quantities: (1) More, (2) Less, and (3) Same.
It could then, be reasonably argued that the chance probability 
of each response category is 1/3 and that the likelihood of a 
fortuitous correct response is 1/3 (Same), while that for a 
fortuitous incorrect response is 1/3 (More) + 1/3 (Less) =
2/3. This would be an accurate analysis if, for example, to 
obtain his judgment,a subject were to pick from a container 
one of three slips of paper each marked with a different 
response category. But a subject seeking a solution to the 
conservation problem does not operate in this manner, and there 
is good reason to expect that the number of alternative 
response categories effectively available is two— or at 
least problematically between two and three. In the lower
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limit this would render the probability of a fortuitous correct 
response equal to 1/2 and is tantamount to characterizing the 
subject's task as making a decision between response cate­
gories Different and Same.
Flavell (1963) has noted that the common denominator 
among non-conservers consists of a unidimensional, perceptual 
centration approach to problems of quantity judgment, the 
dimension which is centered depending upon the particulars 
of the perceptual configuration at hand. The empirical 
essence of Piaget's conservation problems is the perceptual 
illusion of disparate quantities after the so-called quali­
tative transformation of one of the objects. The conflict 
or illusion regarding the apparent inequality of amount is 
effected because the child centers on a single dimension or 
perceptual attribute and ignores the other(s). For example, 
in tasks on discontinuous and continuous quantity, an incor­
rect response stems from the child's inclination to invariably 
correlate height with amount even though the diameters of the 
containers being compared are different.
Piaget (1967) has demonstrated— and this writer has 
empirically confirmed it to his own satisfaction--that 
children are essentially natural conservers, expecting the 
amounts to remain equal but reneging on their expectation 
upon observation of the post-transformation perceptual con­
figuration. This writer, and Miller et al. (1973), have 
documented that a given illusion prompts the same kind of 
incorrect response from transitional and non-conservers.
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Thus, if a child is unable to logically or systematically 
resolve the problem yet is required to give an answer, there 
are realistically two alternatives open to him: Same and,
depending on the illusion, More or Less, but not both.
The implication of the above is that the probability 
of a fortuitous More is not equal to the probability of a 
fortuitous Less and in a given situation one of these likeli­
hoods tends to zero while the other tends to 1/2. The 
probability of Same, as defined by 1 - (jg.[Less] + jg^More]), 
has as its practical limits 1/3 to 1/2, and a plausible, 
albeit compromising, estimate would be the midpoint of the 
probability interval, i.e., £(Same) = 5/12. Alternatively, 
however, if it were known that during the course of an experi­
ment almost all the incorrect responses are More, then a 
better assignment of fortuitous probabilities would be 
jg(Same) = jg(More) = 1/2 and ja(Less) = 0.0. Whatever estimate 
of the parameter is decided upon, the theoretical sampling 
distribution, once derived from the binomial expansion, can 
be used to determine the probability that an observed per­
formance is of a fortuitous nature. An example, using data 
from Elkind and 5choenfeld (1972) follows.
The experiment included four separate conservation 
tasks (content areas), each with the possibility of one or 
two questions being asked. If on the first pass the child 
responded with an incorrect judgment to the usual conserva­
tion question, he was asked, "Would it be the same if I put it 
back as it was before?" Over the four tasks the maximum and
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minimum scores attainable were 12 and 4 respectively. A 
flow diagram of the questioning and scoring procedure is 








































Define event class A where eachevent A^ represents 
the number of correct responses on the first pass.
Let: ja(same) = 1/2
_g ( different) «• 1/2 
n = 4
Then: A. A~ A., A. Ac event1 2 3 4 5
E1 = (1/2 + 1/2)4 = 1 4  6 4 1 likelihood
□ 1 2 3 4 no. correct
Define event class B where each event represents
the number of correct responses on the second pass.
Let: _£(same) = 1/2
^(different) = 1/2
m = number of tasks on second pass 
Then: = (1/2 + 1/2)m where 0 m 4.
Event A5: 4 of 4 correct on first pass.
p(Acj) = 1/16, m = 0, net score = 4 x 3  = 12.
Event A4 : 3 of 4 correct on first pass,
p (A4 ) = 4/16, m = 1, prelim, score = 3 x 3 = 9 .
B.j B^ event 
E^ = (1/2 + 1/2 )^  = 1 1 likelihood
0 1 no. correct
If A and B are independent events, jd(A and B) = ja(A) x ja(B). 
ja(A4 and B 1 ) = r(A4 ) x £.(B.,) = 4/16 x 1/2 = 4/32, nets 
9 + 1  = 1 0 .
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£(A^ and B2 ) = £(A4 ) x £(B2 ) = 4/16 x 1/2 = 4/32, nets 
9 + 2 = 11.
Event A3: 2 of 4 correct on first pass.
js/A^) = 6/16, m = 2, prelim, score = 2 x 3  = 6.
B^ B^ event
E2 = (1/2 + 1/2)2 = 1 2  1 likelihood
0 1 2 no. correct
£_(A2 and B^ ) = 6/16 x 1/4 = 3/32, nets 6 + 1 + 1  = 8.
£(A2 and B2 ) = 6/16 x 2/4 = 6/32, nets 6 + 2  + 1 = 9 .
£(A^ and B^) = 6/16 x 1/4 = 3/32, nets 6 + 2 + 2 = 10.
In the same manner as above the joint probabilities
and respective point totals are determined for events A2 and 
A^. The completed calculations yield the set of all possible 
point totals and corresponding probabilities. Some point
totals can be obtained in more than one way and their net
probability is obtained by simply summing the probabilities 
of each path. The resultant probability function, £(X), and 
distribution function, £(X ), are shown in Table 3.4.
The probability distribution of Table 3.4 represents 
a population of scores and effectively defines the proba­
bility that an individual who does not possess a solution, 
but is capable of responding dichotomously to the questions, 
will net the respective point total. Alternatively if a 
single individual is sampled, the probability that he will 
fortuitously score X or better is equal to /L£(X). The
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TABLE 3.4
THEORETICAL PROBABILITY AND DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS 
OF FORTUITOUS CONSERVATION SCORES: BASED ON
ELKIND AND SCHOENFELD (1972)
SCORING PROCEDURE
X £(X) I r (X)
4 .0039 1.0000
5 .01 57 .9961
6 .0547 .9804
7 .1 094 .9257
8 .1914 .81 63
9 .21 87 .6249
1 0 .21 87 .4062
1 1 .1 250 .1 875
1 2 .0625 .0625
^  = 9, CT2 = 2.751
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distribution of means of sample size n, from the above popu­
lation, has a mean equal to the population mean and a sampling 
2
variance of CT~ /n. There were 22 subjects in each group so 
2<r m = 2.75/22 = .125 and the standard error of the mean is 
<T”m = . 353 . Although the population is certainly not nor­
mally distributed, the central limit theorem provides that 
the distributions of all possible means is normal and with 
this knowledge we can determine the probability that the group 
means reported by Elkind and Schoenfeld (1972) came from the 
null (or fortuitous) population of scores. For example, for 
the six year olds in CE we have: Z = X - / (j~m =
9.2 - 9/.353 = .565. The probability of sampling, from the 
null population, a mean equal to or greater than 9.2 is about 
.28 and this is clearly not sufficiently remote to conclude 
that the six year olds can solve CE.
The group performance reported by Elkind and Schoen­
feld and the calculated fortuitous probabilities are shown in 
Table 3.5. Both age groups performed better than chance would 
dictate on Cl but in CE the six year olds did not exceed 
chance expectations and the four year olds did significantly 
worse than chance. The latter point is interesting in that 
it implies that the younger children were impelled by the per­
ceptual cue to judge the quantities as different. The CI-CE 
decalage is clearly apparent since both groups passed Cl but 
neither group managed CE.
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TABLE 3.5
GROUP MEAN PERFORMANCE AND FORTUITOUS 
PROBABILITY FOR ELKIND AND 
SCHOENFELD (1972) DATA
T ask Age 5core Z 5core £
Cl 6 years 
4 years














For preoperational children Elkind and Schoenfeld had 
predicted: "identity and conservation should precede and be
a necessary prerequisite to equivalence conservation [p. 
529]," and they concluded: "identity but not equivalence
conservation in young children, but both identity and equiva­
lence conservation in older children [p. 532]." The reported 
difference between the four year old Cl and CE groups, though 
statistically significant and in the predicted direction, 
seems not to warrant the express conclusions made in their 
paper and certainly not that Cl is a necessary prerequisite 
to CE since no unequivocal passing performance in CE was in 
fact demonstrated.
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The preceding example demonstrated construction of a 
theoretical distribution which was then applied to group per­
formances, but the model can be equally well used to evaluate 
the fortuitous extent of an individual performance.
In order to use the binomial it is only necessary 
that each of the trials for a single subject be an indepen­
dent event with a finite set of outcomes having respective 
invariant probabilities of occurrence. These probabilities 
are considered to be population parameters and must be com­
bined in accord with the specific scoring procedure. A 
descriptive label for the general technique— that is binomial 
model or otherwise— would be "Stochastic Modeling of Fortuitous 
Performance in Problem Solving Tasks" (Chiseri, 1974).
A model for the judgment criterion will be described 
next. Consider a four trial set of conservation problems 
employing a simple judgment criterion where such responses are 
interpreted as a dichotomous random variable. If the proba­
bility of fortuitous success on a given trial is jd, then the 
probability of failure, £, is 1 - £. A subject that is behav­
ing fortuitously on the problems can be expected to achieve 
zero to four successes with a set of commensurate probabili­
ties: with exactly what probability depends on £_ (and n, the
number of independent trials). Table 3.6 shows the various 
theoretical expectancies over four trials for three different 
values of £.
For each of the distributions of the probability of 
a given score X, jd(X) is known as the probability function
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TABLE 3.6
PROBABILITY AND DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS 




R  = 1/3, R = 2/3 R = 2/5, £  = 3/5 jo = 1/2 , R = 1/2
R (X) rn(x) £(X) Tfi(x) jo (X) 5Le (X)
0 .1 975 1 .000 .1 296 1 .000 .0625 1 .000
1 .3951 .8025 .3456 .8704 .2500 .9375
2 .2963 .4074 .3456 .5248 .3750 .6875
3 .0988 .1111 . 1 536 . 1 792 .2500 .31 25
4 .01 23 .01 23 .0256 .0256 .0625 .0625
and X  E.(X) as the distribution function. From the latter
function significance levels of performances can be deter-
mined and of course this is what would most interest a 
researcher who must decide if a performance was fortuitous 
or based upon some comprehension or a meaningful solution to 
the problem. For a given n there is a family of distributions, 
depending upon £, and three of these are shown in Figure 3.3. 
Once £  is set the significance level (one or two tailed) may 











Fig. 3.3. Graph of distribution function of fortu­



































3.4. Flow diagram of the Elkind scoring cri-
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A slightly altered version of the Elkind and Schoen­
feld (1972) scoring 'method was used in the present study and 
is also amenable to stochastic modeling. The modified Elkind 
procedure used was described previously and is diagrammed 
above in Figure 3.4. It will be referred to throughout the 
remainder of the text as the Elkind criterion. In the Elkind 
criterion, on the second trial within a Memory condition, the 
child is asked a second question provided he failed the first. 
The following sample calculations will set jd = 1/2 for both 
the first and second questions, since they are both funda­
mentally dichotomous judgment situations where response cate­
gories same and different are respectively correct and incor­
rect .
Sample Calculation for Elkind Criterion
Event class A and B will be used to represent the 
first and second questions respectively. Each event A^ repre­
sents the number of correct responses on the first question, 
where £, = H  = and n = 4. Thus the events and their like­
lihoods are determined from the binomial:
Ag A^  A^ Ag A^ Event
E.| = (1/2 + 1/2)^ = 1 4 6 4 1 Likelihood
0 1 2 3 4 No. Correct
Each event B ^ represents the number of correct re­
sponses on the second question where ja = = 1/2 and m, the
number of second questions, is a function of event A and 
whether the child missed question one on a second trial within
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a Memory condition. The determination of B events compli­
cates things a bit, and the probability that a miss on ques­
tion one will occur on the second trial of a Memory pair must 
be integrated into the joint probabilities. Once m is deter­
mined, the outcomes for B and their likelihoods are deter­
mined from the expansion of: = (1/2 + 1/2)m , where
D ^ m i  2.
Event Ao: zero of 4 correct on the first question.
jd(Aq) = 1/16, prelim, points = 0, m = 2.
E 2 = (1/2 + 1 / 2 ) 2 = 1 2 1 ^ e l i h o o d
0 1 2  no. correct
jd(Aq ) x £.(^g) ~ 1/16 x 1/4 = 1/64, nets 0 + 1 = 2 .
js(Ag) x jd(B,|) = 1/16 x 1/2 = 2/64, nets 0 + 3 = 3.
jd(Aq ) x £.(B2 ) = 1/16 x 1/2 = 2/64, nets 0 + 4 = 4.
Event Ai: 1 of 4 correct on first question.
jd(A.|) = 4/16, prelim, points = 3. There are two possible 
values of m: 1 or 2. jD(m = 1 ) is the probability that the 
success on event A comes on the second trial of a given 
Memory condition pair. There are four possible outcomes for 
event A^  and two of them yield m = 1 and two yield m = 2 , 
thus £_(m = 1) = p/m = 2) = 1/2.
Let 
m = 1
a 1 1 likelihood
E 2 =  ( 1 / 2  +  1 / 2 )  1 =
0 1 no. correct
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£(A^) x £(m = 1) x jo(Bg) = 4/16 x 1/2 x 1/2 = 4/16, nets 
3 + 1  = 4.
jd (A1 ) X  £(m = 1) X £.(B1 ) = 4/16 x 1/2 x 1/2 = 4/64, nets 
3 + 2 = 5 .
Let 
m = 2
E2 =(1/2 + 1/2)2 = 1 2 1 likelihood
0 1 2 no. correct
jd (A.j ) x jo(m = 2) x £(Bg) = 4/16 x 1/2 x 1/4 = 2/64, nets
3 + 1  = 5 .
£_ (A1 ) X  £(m = 2) x = 4/16 x 1/2 x 1/2 = 4/64, nets
3 + 3 = 6 .
£(A^) x £(m = 2) x £(B2 ) = 4/16 x 1/2 x 1/4 = 2/64, nets 
3 + 4 = 7 .
Event A2 ’• 2 of 4 correct on the first question.
£(A^) = 6/16, prelim, points = 6. There are three possible 
values of m: D, 1 or 2. £(m = 0) is the probability that
both successes on event A2 come on the second trial of each 
of the two Memory condition pairs. The probabilities for the 
values of m can be determined by noting that there are four 
trials and they are essentially sampled two at a time. That 
is, there are exactly = 4!/2! x 2! = 6 ways to allocate
two successes across four trials. One of the six ways yields 
m = 0 , four of the ways yields m = 1 (i.e., one success on
the second of a pair) and one way gives m = 2 (i.e., no 
successes on the second of a pair). The respective
80
probabilities are: 1/6, 4/6, and 1/6.
Let m = 0, there is no second question, = 1 •
£. (A ^ ) x £.(fn = □) = 6/16 x 1/6 = 4/64, nets 6 + 0 = 6.
Let m = 1
E2 = (1/2 + 1/2)1 = 1 1 likelihood
0 1 no. correct
jd(A2 ) x jd(iti = 1) x £.(Bj-|) = 6/16 x 4/6 x 1/2 = 8/64, nets 
6 + 1 = 7 .
jd(A2 ) x ^(m = 1) x £.(B^ ) = 6/16 x 4/6 x 1/2 = 8/64, nets 
6 + 2 = 8 .
Let m = 2
E2 = (1/2 + 1/2)2 = 1  2 1 likelihood
0 1 2 no. correct
jd(A2 ) x £_(m = 2) x ja(BQ ) = 6/16 x 1/6 x 1/4 = 1/64, nets 
6 + 2  = 8 .
jd(A2 ) x js(m = 2) x £.(B.|) = 6/16 x 1/6 x 2/4 = 2/64, nets 
6 + 3 = 9 .
£_(A2 ) x j3(m = 2) x jd (B2 ) = 6/16 x 1/6 x 1/4 = 1/64,nets 
6 + 4 = 1 0 .
Event A3: 3 of 4 correct on the first question.
-^ (A 3) = 4/16, prelim, points = 9. There are two possible
4values of m: 0 or 1 . There are = 4!/3! = 4 ways to
allocate three successes across four trials and two of them 
yield m = 0 and two give m = 1. Thus, the respective proba­
bilities are each 1/2.
81
Let m = 0, there is no second question, = 1•
£(A^) x £(m = 0) = 4/16 x 1/2 = B/64, nets 9 + 0 = 0 .
Let m = 1, there is one second question.
E2 = (1/2 + 1/2)1 = 1 1 likelihood
0 1 no. correct
£(A^) x jo(m = 1) x £(B|-j) = 4/16 x 1/2 x 1/2 = 4/64, nets 
9 + 1  = 1 0 .
£  (A ^ ) x £(m = 1) x £  (B ,j ) = 4/16 x 1/2 x 1/2 = 4/16, nets 
9 + 2 = 1 1 .
Event A4 : 4 of 4 correct on the first question.
£(A^) = 1/16, nets 12, there are no second questions.
The probability function of X, where X is a random 
discrete variable representing total points across the four 
trials, can be easily obtained by summing the calculated 
joint probabilities for each unique value of X. The resultant 
probability and distribution function of X for three values 
of £  are shown in Table 3.7 and the family of significance 
curves is in Figure 3.5.
The fortuitous models can be used to classify indi­
viduals or groups as pass, fail or fortuitous (transitional?). 
The pass categorization is determined by selecting a signifi­
cance level and comparing the individual's score with the 
appropriate curve of Figure 3.3 or 3.5. Groups can be ana­
lyzed for fortuitous behavior be doing a goodness of fit test 
for observed vs. theoretical probabilities or a test of sig­














PROBABILITY AND DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS OF FORTUITOUS 
PERFORMANCE FDR A FOUR TRIAL SET UNDER 
THE ELKIND CRITERION
£  = 1/3, a  = 2/3 a  = 2/5 * 5L = 3/5 £  = 1/2 , £ = 1/2
R(X) I r (x ) a(x) X r (x ) a(x) rn(x)
.0878 1 .000 .0324 1 .000 .01 56 1 .000
.0878 .9121 .0648 .9676 .0320 .9843
. 1 536 . 8243 .118 .9028 .0780 . 9523
.1 536 .6707 .1 296 .7840 .0936 .8743
.1 372 .51 71 . 1 440 .6544 . 1 248 .7807
. 1 536 .3799 .1 584 .51 04 .1 563 . 6559
.0879 .2263 .1296 .3520 .1 406 .4996
.071 3 . 1 385 .1056 .2224 .1 560 . 3590
.0384 .0672 .0528 .1 1 68 .0780 .2030
.01 65 .0287 .0384 .0640 .0625 .1 250
.01 23 .01 23 .0256 .0256 .0625 .0625
^=5.777,<t2 = 5.545 /U=6 . 485 , c?=5 . 71 3 /V = 7 . 365 , <j2 = 5 . 902
£ e ( x )




1 D 1 2
X
Fig. 3.5. Significance curves of fortuitous performance 




Levels of Measurement 
Nominal Level
Under the assumption of a nominal level of measure­
ment subjects are simply categorized as having passed or 
failed on the set of problems. A quote from Torgerson (1967) 
is appropriate:
In measurement as we use the term, the number assigned 
refers to the relative amount or degree of a property 
possessed by the object itself, whereas, in the different 
nominal scales, the numbers refer to the objects or 
classes of objects. It is the object that is named or 
classified [p. 17].
Torgerson also observes that in nominal measurement 
the notion of property is not moot and that the objects are 
categorized with regard to the presence or absence of one, or 
a compound of properties. The property observed in the dis­
sertation studywas a response— constrained by the procedures 
of the designated criteria— and the property inferred was the 
presence or absence of certain cognitive structuresin the sub­
ject. With identification of only the pass-fail categories 
the relative degrees of the property are simply, "likely all 
there" or "likely not at all there." A consequence of nomi­
nal measurement is that non-parametric statistical methods 
should be applied to the data.
A subject merits a given classification by virtue of 
his performance meeting or not meeting the specified require­
ments. In the study the three scoring criteria employed were 
1)judgment, 2) judgment/explanation and 3) Elkind. Within 
each of these domains there are still criteria to be decided
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upon. For example, what is: an acceptable explanation, the
minimum correct judgments, the minimum number of correct 
judgment/explanation compounds, the minimum score for modi­
fied Elkind, and so forth. It is desirable to be objective 
and consistent from method to method in making these latter 
decisions upon criteria, and the significance levels derived 
from the fortuitous models afford precisely this sense of 
closure.
Fortuitous models were prepared for both the judgment 
and Elkind criteria but not for the judgment/explanation 
criterion. This exclusion was based on the assumption that 
in support of a correct judgment the likelihood of an accept­
able explanation being generated fortuitously is sufficiently 
remote to justify setting its probability close to zero.
Indeed this is utlimately an empirical question but con­
temporary notions in psycholinguistics regarding the myriad 
possibilities for grammatical utterances gives the zero proba­
bility high axiomatic credence and is so invoked. As the 
probability of 4 out of 4 correct judgments was determined to 
be .0625 (see Table 3.6) it follows that the probability of 
4 of 4 acceptable judgment/explanations is less than .0625. 
Thus, the latter criterion runs less risk of false positive 
diagnostics than the former.
Interval Level Measures
An interval level measure implies that the attribute 
of interest can be meaningfully described as a continuum.
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The particular properties of the number system that are 
retained at this level are order and distance. The former 
property assures that a set of measured values can be uniquely 
ordered while the latter holds that the differences between 
pairs of values are uniquely ordered. Transitivity holds for 
both properties and the series of measurements does not have 
a unique origin, i.e., one object cannot meaningfully be said 
to possess a multiple more (or less) of the attribute than 
another object. The reader desiring more depth on theoreti­
cal implications is referred to Torgerson (1958). A practical 
and generally advantageous consequence of interval level data 
is the propriety of using parametric statistical techniques 
which require the order and distance property of numbers.
In conservation research, interval level measures 
are not used as frequently as the nominal level and there has 
been very little formal discussion on this matter. Part of 
the definition of interval level measurement is that the 
numbers must be determined to within a linear transformation 
y = ax + b, where a is any positive number and b any real 
number. A consequence of this requirement is that the dif­
ferences between pairs of measurements can be meaningfully 
ratioed and these ratios remain invariant regardless of the 
measurement units.
If, at the interval level, conservation is assessed 
by x and is also measured with another method, y, then y and 
x should be perfectly correlated if the measures are to be 
subject to the prescribed linear transformation. Three
07
scoring techniques--albeit not procedurally or statistically 
independent of each other— were employed in the study and if 
the assumption of interval level data is reasonable, the indi­
vidual scares should be highly correlated. Since a judgment 
is part of all three scoring methods, there is a built-in 
dependence, thus any resultant linear correspondence is far 
from conclusive— but at least suggestive— evidence for the 
viability of an interval measure of continuum of conservation.
The three scoring criteria and different levels of 
measurement/analyses were adopted primarily to facilitate com­
parison of this study's results with those of other investi­
gators, all of whom have used one or another of the scoring 
procedures and analyses. It is also of general interest to 
determine the correspondences among the criteria/analyses and 
to thus draw inferences regarding the extent to which a con­
flict of results from very similar studies can be attributed 




RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
Introduction
As described in the previous chapter, the basic design 
of the study was to examine the effects of four factors: 
Object, Conflict, Memory and Sequence. The subjects were 
selected on the basis of their age such that they were not yet 
likely to be concrete operational but old enough to under­
stand what was asked of them in the problems; i.e., roughly 
late preoperational to early concrete operational. The sub­
jects' ages and pretest scores were used as covariates for 
interval level data, but the analyses of covariance indicated 
that these variables did not markedly effect the error varia­
tion or differences between groups— the latter obtained pri­
marily because the cells were balanced for mean age and pre­
test scores were correlated with age. However, the mean age 
of the subjects who "passed" their set of four problems was 
somewhat higher than the mean age for all the subjects (67.47 
vs 65.18). The standard normal deviate of 1.60,calculated on 
the sample of 17 who passed the judgment criterion,indicated 
that the probability that this sample came from the 'popula­
tion' of total subjects was about .06. In the original design 
the age range was intended to be 5-6 years, but circumstances 
made it infeasible to get a large enough sample in this range.
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The more homogeneous sample would have been contributory to 
less error variation, especially of an interactive nature in 
that this source of error cannot be compensated for by the 
analysis of covariance.
Consequently the data was also analyzed with age as 
a factor. It was decided that the variance should not be 
analyzed as a five factor ( 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 3 )  design since 
this would have necessitated as few as two observations in 
one cell and only three observations in four other cells. An 
analysis of the nominal level data did indicate that the pro­
files across age were comparable at the two Sequence levels.
As the analyses of the original basic design showed that 
there were no effects for the Sequence factor— nor was it of 
any particular theoretical interest— it was eliminated for 
the age analyses. The resultant design incorporating age as 
a factor was a 2 x 2 x 2 x 3  where the first three factors 
were the same as in the basic design (Object, Conflict, 
Sequence) and the fourth factor comprised of three levels of 
Age: (1) Young, (2) Middle, and (3) Old. It should be noted
that a first age analysis used a median split to describe two 
levels of age, but this yielded no effects so a tri-partition 
Age factor was instituted. The basis for the level.s of the 
Age factor (in months) are shown in Table 4.1.
With the introduction of age as a factor the organiza­
tion of the presentation of the results is itself reminiscent
of a balanced factorial design and is outlined in Figure 4.1 
The sequence of presentation will be: (1) General findings,
(2) Nominal level data and (3) Interval level data.
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TABLE 4.1
AGE DATA FOR THE 3-LEVEL AGE FACTOR 




Level Range Mean Std. Dev. Number
Young -61 58.3 2.94 29
Middle 62-68 64.9 1.94 37
Old 69+ 72.1 2.29 30
High 65+ 70.0 3.31 48
Split ,^ Low -64 60.3 3.40 48
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GENERAL
NOMINAL LEVEL INTERVAL LEVEL
SEQUENCE AGE SEQUENCE AGE
3 CRITERIA 3 CRITERIA 3 CRITERIA 3 CRITERIA




The overall means, standard deviations and descrip­
tions of the study variables are given in Table 4.2. As a 
first step in the organization of the data, an analysis of 
the linear relationships among all the study variables was 
executed. The factor matrix from a principal components 
solution with varimax rotation performed on the fifteen 
variable set is shown in Table 4.3. Factors were extracted 
for characteristic root values of .7 or greater, which yielded 
87 percent of the total variance for the five factors. The 
first component is easily identified as the "conservation 
score factor" where the scores across the four problems and 
within each Memory condition (2 problems) all load at .90 or 
higher. The only other variable that correlates appreciably 
with the first component is the Conflict and its positive 
loading implies that scores tend to be higher for the Imagery 
level.
The second component is made up of the Age and Pre­
test variables which are correlated only moderately (.30) 
with each other but sufficiently interrelated to emerge as 
effectively the sole variables on this component. The third, 
fourth and fifth components, comprised respectively of the 
Sex, Sequence and Object variables, are unique as each 
involves only a single variable. It is noteworthy that these 
three variables are not implicated with any of the dependent 
variables. The rotated factor matrix shows the data to be 
reasonable and that within the linear system there are no
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TABLE 4.2
STUDY VARIABLES: DESCRIPTION MEAN
AND STANDARD DEVIATION
Variable 
No . Description Mean
Std. Dev.
1 judgment criterion: recall cue .521 0.821
2 judgment criterion: no recall 
cue
.573 0.867
3 judgment criterion: 4 took 
total 1 .094 1 .596
4 judge/explain criterion: recall 
cue
1 .833 3.093
5 judge/explain criterion: no 
recall cue
1 .958 3.1 91
6 judge/explain criterion: 4 
took total 3.791
6.1 45
7 Elkind criterion: recall cue 2.81 2 1 .882
a Elkind criterion: no recall 
cue 2.91 7
1 .895
9 Elkind criterion: 4 took total 5.729 3.555
1 0 pretest score 5.677 0.788
11 age, in months 65.187 5.913
1 2 sex: female = 1, male = 2 1 .542 0.501
1 3 object factor: within = 1 , 
between = 2 1 .500 0.502
1 4 conflict factor: concrete = 1, 
image = 2 1 .500 0.502
1 5 sequence factor: recall first 
= 1, recall second = 2 1 .500 0.502
TABLE 4.3
ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX OF STUDY VARIABLES PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS 







1 .936 .115 -.072 -.01 5 .079 .902
2 .941 -.026 .002 .029 -.116 .900
3 .882 .045 -.035 .008 -.022 . 9B9
4 .947 .1 39 -.039 .033 .045 .921
5 .968 .059 .004 .048 -.076 .948
6 .979 .101 -.017 .042 -.01 6 .972
7 .903 .1 66 -.062 .004 .1 89 .883
8 .933 .029 -.01 7 .005 -.053 .874
9 .975 .1 04 -.042 .005 .072 .969
10 .082 .792 -.065 -.129 .21 5 .700
11 .1 29 .792 .039 .1 59 -.1 92 .708
1 2 .003 -.049 .948 -.045 -.064 .907
1 3 .01 4 .01 6 -.037 .01 5 .957 .91 8
14 .589 -.099 -.444 -.076 -.096 .569
1 5 .037 .01 9 -.027 .983 .01 4 .969
Variance proportion .5786 .0876 .0768 .0689 .0635
Cumulative
Variance proportion .5786 .662 .7430 .8119 .8754
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surprising or uninterpretable allocations of variation.
The high correlations between the three criterion 
measures— variables 3, 6 and 9 in Table 4.4, lend credence 
to employment of a continuous measure in conservation prob­
lems. Of course judgment was parcel to all three of the 
criterion measures and there were various procedural depen­
dencies that would also contribute to strong inter-correla­
tions. In the judge/explain criterion there could be no cor­
rect explanation with a correct judgment and for the modi­
fied Elkind criterion, the second question was not asked 
unless the initial conservation judgment was incorrect.
TABLE 4.4
INTERCORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE THREE CRITERION 





4 .97 .81 .94
5 .86 .96 .96
6 .94 .91 .97
7 ,96 .75 .90
CO •79 .96 .92
9 .93 .91 .97
4 5 6 7 8
91
98 .98
93 .82 • CD VO
82 .94 .90 .77
93 .93 .95 .94
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Within each criterion the correlation between the 
score in the Recall and No Recall condition--variables 1 vs 2,
4 vs 5, and 7 vs 8— are quite high, indicating that the two 
levels of the Memory factor were somewhat commensurate with 
each other. In general both the non-parametric and para­
metric analyses of the data confirmed the impotence of the 
Memory factor, thus the emphasis in reporting the results and 
drawing conclusions will be upon the subjects' total score 
over the four trials. Unless a specific statement to the con­
trary is made, the referenced criterion scores will be vari­
ables 3, 6 and 9 which are respectively, Judgment (JTOT), 
Judge/Explain (JETOT) and Elkind (ETOT).
In all, there were 26 subjects who made at least 2 
correct judgments. The data indicating the number of correct 
judgments, attendant verbal rationale, and acceptable/unaccept­
able status is shown in the Appendix in Table A.8. Two judges 
independently rated the verbal explanations according to the 
guidelines discussed in Section III.2. Concurrence between 
ratings was achieved in 96 percent of the cases and a test of 
independence showed the judges'decisions to be significantly 
correlated (X = 34.58, £ <  .001, Yates correction). It is 
interesting to note that in the 17 cases where the subject 
made the requisite 4 of 4 correct judgments, the judges con­
curred 100 percent, and that only one of the 26 instances of 




Sequence as a Factor
Each subject was categorized as pass or fail in 
accord with the appropriate Fortuitous model and signifi­
cance level specifications (Table 3.3). For the purposes of 
investigating the role of the recall cue, a subject received 
one pass mark if he performed correctly on the two trials 
within a respective Memory level. It should be noted that 
for the resultant data shown in Table 4.5, there are two 
entries per subject, or 2 x 96 in all.
5ince the frequencies in Table 4.5 are not indepen­
dent of each other, a Chi-Square test is not quite appropri­
ate (McNemar, 1969). Due to the inflated sample size the 
calculated values of Chi Square are exaggerated, and as even 
these overestimates are clearly not significant, the inde­
pendence of the Memory factor and performance is not rejected. 
The Chi Square values, calculated on the data of Table 4.6,show 
that a subject's performances in the Recall and No Recall 
trials are not independent of each other. The above is inter­
preted as sound evidence for the negligible effect of the 
Memory factor.
The results for JTOT, JETOT and ETOT, presented 
respectively in Tables 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9, are in large self- 
explanatory. Under the JTOT criterion there were seventeen 
pass classifications but only one of these was in a Concrete 
Conflict paradigm (Table 4.7a). The distribution of pass and 
fail for the four paradigms is shown in Table 4.7b and the
98
TABLE 4.5
DISTRIBUTION OF PA5S AND FAIL ON MEMORY FACTOR: 
TWO ENTRIES PER SUBJECT
Criteria
Judgm ent Judg e/Explain
Cue No Cue Cue No Cue
21 25 1 7 1 9
75 71 79 77
TABLE 4.6




Recall Cue Recall Cue
Pass Fail Pass Fail
Pass 17 8 16 8
No Cue
Fail 4 67 4 68
X2 = 4.1 6, £  <.001
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chi square indicates a dependency between success and para­
digm. Table 4.7c shows that the relationship between Con­
flict and success is crucial, while the Object and Sequence 
factors are of no consequence. Table 4.7d shows the hier­
archy of difficulty to be: CE = CIC >  CEN = Cl.
The JETOT criterion yielded 16 passes (Table 4.8b) and 
ETOT gave 20 passes (Table 4.9b). The findings for the three 
criterion are markedly similar except for the total number of 
passes. This discrepancy is, however, just as would be 
expected from the respective tolerance levels of fortuitous 
performance. ETOT was most lenient in this regard while 
JETOT was the most stringent, and the number of non-fortuitous 
performances (i.e., pass) within each criterion appropriately 
reflects these specifications. The tolerance of fortuity also 
contributed to an apparent difference in discriminability 
along the paradigm and levels of Conflict dimensions, in that 
the probability of type II error was least for ETOT and highest 
for JETOT. As the "actual" differences among the paradigms 
and between the Conflict levels are the same regardless of 
criterion, and thetotal sample size was a constant, it can be 
said that ETOT had the most power, or was the criterion most 




RE5ULT5 OF JUDGMENT CRITERION, 4 of 4 CORRECT = PASS:
SEQUENCE AS A FACTOR
Table 4.7a
Frequency of Pass in Each Experimental Condition
Between Obj ect Within Obj ect
CE CEN CIC Cl
Sequence 1 0 3 1 3
Sequence 2 0 5 0 5
Table 4.7b 
Distribution of Pass and Fail for the 
Four Conservation Paradigms
CE CIC CEN Cl
Pass 0 1 8 8
Fail 24 23 16 16
X2 = 12.92, £  <.01
1 01
Table 4.7c
Distribution of Pass and Fail for the
Experiment Factors
Conflict Object Sequence
Concrete Image Within Between 1 2
Pass 1 1 6 9 8 7 1 0
Fail 47 32 39 40 41 38
X2 = 16.1, £  < .001
Table 4.7d
Chi 5quare Values and Siqnificance Levels
for Paired Comparisons of the Four
Conservation Paradiqms
CE-CIC CE-CEN CE-CI CIC-CEIM CIC-CI CEN-■Cl
X2 .021 7.72 7.72 5.26 5.26 0
£ .01 .01 .05 .05
1 02
TABLE 4.8
RESULTS FOR JUDGMENT PLUS EXPLANATION CRITERION, 4 of 
4 CORRECT = PASS: SEQUENCE AS A FACTOR
Table 4.Ba
Number of Passes in Each Experimental Condition
Between Obj ect With in Object
CE CEN CIC Cl
Sequence 1 0 3 1 3
Sequence 2 0 4 0 5
Table 4.8b 
Distribution of Pass and Fail for the 
Four Conservation Paradigms
CE CIC CEN Cl
Pass 0 1 7 8
Fail 24 23 17 16
X2 = 11.7, £  <.01
1 03
Table 4.Be
Distribution of Pass and Fail for the
Experimental Factors
Conflict Object Sequence
Concrete Image Within Between 1 2
Pass 
F ail
1 25 9 7 





14.50, £ <  .001
Table 4.8d
Chi Square Values and Siqnificance Levels 
for Paired Comparisons of the Four 
Conservation Paradiqms
CE-CIC CE-CEN CE-CI CIC-CEN CIC-CI CEN-CI
X2
2.
.0«J 6.33 7.72 4.03 5.26 




RE5ULT5 FOR ELKIND CRITERION, 11 OR 12 
POINTS: SUCCESS SEQUENCE AS A FACTOR
Table 4.9a
Number of Passes in Each Experimental Condition
Between 0bj ect Within Obj ect
CE CEN CIC Cl
Sequence 1 0 4 1 4
Sequence 2 0 6 0 5
Table 4.9b 
Distribution of Pass and Fail for the 
Four Conservation Paradigms
CE CIC CEN Cl
Pass 0 1 10 9
Fail 24 23 14 15
X2 = 20.72, £  4.001
1 0 5
Table 4.9c
Distribution of Pass and Fail for the
Experimental Factors
Conflict Object Sequence
Concrete Image Within Between 1 2
Pass
Fail
1 19 10 10 
47 29 38 38
9 1 1 
39 38
X2 = 20.5, p 4. . 001
Table 4.9d
Chi Square Values and 5iqnificance Levels 
for Paired Comparisons of the Four 
Conservation Paradiqms
CE-CIC CE-CEN CE-CI CIC-CEN CIC-CI CEN-CI
X2 .021 10.74 9.16 9.54 6.58 .086
£ .01 .01 .01 . 02
1 06
Age as a Factor
The salient data for the JTOT, JETOT and ETOT cri­
teria are respectively presented in Tables 4.10, 4.11 and 
4.12. The allocation of pass and fail across the three 
ages for JTOT is in Table 4.10a. The Middle and Old sub­
jects performed equally well and significantly better than 
the Young children, as only one of the latter earned a pass. 
The more interesting finding is presented in Table 4.10b 
where it is seen that only in Imagery paradigms was there any 
differential performance between the Age groups. The intra­
paradigm performance data is presented in Table 4.10b and 
none of the chi square values reach the .05 critical value of 
5.99, although Cl is very near. The chi square values and 
probabilities for Within vs Between and Concrete vs Imagery 
are shown in Table 4.10c. The Object comparisons are all 
negligible whereas differences on the Conflict factor are 
observed at the Mid and Old Age levels. The results for JETOT, 
as shown in Table 4.11, are very much like those for JTOT.
The results for ETOT deviate a bit from the other 
criteria. From Table 4.12a it can be seen that, as compared 
with JTOT, one more Young subject and two more Mid subjects 
passed in ETOT, and the proportional increase was such that 
the chi square only reached the .10 level. However, if the 
Mid and Old data are combined, the chi square for the resul- 
tant 2 x 2  contingency table is significant (p<.05, X =
4.'i8, df = 1). For the intra-paradigm comparisons only Cl 
shows a significant, p <  .05, relationship between Age and
success (see Table 4.12b).
The comparisons on the Object factor and Conflict 
factor of Table 4.12c shows ETOT to be similar to the other 
criteria except that the Imagery level is significantly 
easier for the Mid as well as the Old subjects. It was noted 
previously that regards the paradigms and the Conflict factor, 
ETOT had greater statistical power than either JTOT or JETOT, 
and it seems likely that this sensitivity is effectively mani­
fest at Mid and Young, but not at the Old, age levels.
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TABLE 4.10
RE5ULT5 FOR JUDGMENT CRITERION 4 of 4 CORRECT =
5UCCE55: AGE AS A FACTOR
Table 4.10a 
Distribution of Pass and Fail Across Age
Young Mid Old
Pass 1 8 8
Fail 28 29 22
n
(MX
6.07, p < .05
Table 4.10b
Dis tribution of Pass and Fail Across Aqe within
the Conservation Paradiqms
CEN Cl CE CIC
Young Mid Old Young Mid Old Young Mid Old Young Mid Old
Pass 1 3 4 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 1 0
Fail 5 7 4 7 6 3 9 8 7 7 8 8
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Table 4.10c
Chi 5quare Values and Significance Levels for 
Within vs Between (W-B) and Concrete vs 
Image (C-I) Factors at Each Age Level
Young Mid Old
W-B C-I W-B C-I W-B C-I
X2 1 1 1 3.37 0 9.02
£  .10 .005
1 1 0
TABLE 4.11
RESULTS FDR JUDGMENT PLUS EXPLANATION CRITERION, 4 of 
4 CORRECT = SUCCESS: AGE AS A FACTOR
Table 4.11a 









INJ II 5.95, £_ < . 05
Table 4.11b 
Distribution of Pass and Fail Across Aq e within
the Conservation Paradiqms
CEN Cl CE CIC
Young Mid Old Young Mid Old Young Mid Old Young Mid Old
Pass
Fail
1 2 4  0 4 4  0 0 0  







Chi Square Values and Significance Levels for 
Within vs Between (W-B) and Concrete vs 
Image (C-I) Factors at Each Age Level
Young Mid Old
W-B C-I W-B C-I W-B C-I




RESULTS FOR ELKIND CRITERION, 11 OR 12 POINTS = SUCCESS:
AGE A5 A FACTOR
Table 4.12a 










4.78, £ < . 1 0
Table 4.12b
Distribution of Pass and Fail Across Aqe within 
the Conservation Paradigms
CEN Cl CE CIC
Young Mid Old Young Mid Old Young Mid Old Young Mid Old
Pass
Fail
2 4 4  0 5 4  0 0 0  0 1 





Chi Square Values and Significance Levels for 
Within vs Between (W-B) and Concrete vs 
Image (C-I) Factors at Each Age Level
Young Mid Old
W-B C-I W-B C-I W-B C-I




Sequence as a Factor
The cell means for the basic design are shown in 
Table 4.13. The variance was analyzed by multivariate 
(Manova), univariate (Anova) and repeated measures (RM) 
techniques. In the Manova a subject's score in the Recall 
and the No Recall conditions were the two dependent variables, 
while in the Anova the total score for the two Memory levels 
was the dependent variable. The RM analysis treated the 
Recall and No Recall scores as the two repeated measures. In 
order to contrast the three scoring techniques, each criterion 
was analyzed with the above statistical procedures, thus nine 
separate result summaries are reported in Table 4.14 (Manova, 
Anova) and Table 4.15 (RM).
Due to the multiplicity of statistical procedures and 
criteria, it was desirable to have an objective--distribution 
free if possible— measure to compare the various analyses 
results. It was also necessary to have this general measure 
of the disparity among group means uniformly applicable to 
multifactor and multivariate (dependent) analyses. An appro­
priate measure is the Wilks lambda criterion, -A_ , which is 
derived from the mathematical theory of likelihood-ratio 
criteria (Anderson, 1958). _/\- is inversely related to the dis­
parity, that is, the larger the disparity— relative to within 
group variability— the smaller is A- . In the Manova case 
the larger the disparity among group centroids--relative to
TABLE 4.13
CELL MEANS FDR THE EIGHT GROUP, 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 FACTORIAL 
DESIGN: SEQUENCE AS A FACTOR
Group Means
Covariates Judgment Judge/Explain Elkind
Paradigm 0 C 5 n Pre-Test Age R NR Total R NR Total R NR Total
1 1 1 1 2 5.67 64.1 0.1 67 0.1 67 0.333 0.667 0.667 1 .333 1 .917 2.000 3.91 7
CIC 1 1 2 12 5.58 67.1 0.000 0.1 67 0.1 67 0.000 0.333 0.333 1 .500 1 o 833 3.333
1 2 1 1 2 5.33 64.5 0.833 1 .1 67 2.000 2.833 3.667 6. 500 3.333 4.1 67 7.500
Cl 1 2 2 1 2 5.75 65.8 0.91 7 1 .000 1 .91 7 3.500 3.667 7.167 3.41 7 3.667 7.083
2 1 1 1 2 6.00 64.5 0.083 0.000 0.083 0.333 0.000 0.333 2.1 67 1 .833 4.000
CE 2 1 2 1 2 5.33 64.0 0.083 0.000 0.083 0.1 67 0.000 0.1 67 2.1 67 1.917 4.083
2 2 1 1 2 5. 75 65.8 0.917 0.750 1 .667 2.667 2.500 5.1 67 3.500 3.41 7 6.91 7
CEN 2 2 2 1 2 6.00 66.1 1 .1 67 1 .333 2.500 4.500 4.833 9 .333 4.500 4.500 9.000
Key of Symbols:
0 = object: 1 = Within, 2 = Between
C = Conflict: 1 = Concrete, 2 = Image
5 = Sequence: 1 = Recall cue first, 2 = Cue second
n = number of subjects in the group 
R = Recall cue (2 tasks)
NR = No Recall cue (2 tasks)
Total = R + NR scores (4 tasks)
TABLE 4.14
INTERVAL LEVEL DATA RESULT SUMMARY FDR 3 FACTOR MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF
VARIANCE: SEQUENCE AS A FACTOR
Judgment Judge/Explain Elkind
2 Dependent 1 Dependent 
variables variable
2 Dependent 1 Dependent 
variables variable
2 Dependent 1 Dependent 
variables variable
F 1 -A. F 1 -JS- F 1— A. F 1 - W F 1 -j\_ F 1 - W
Obj ect 1 .39b .031 .01 .000 1.17b .026 .00 .000 2.43b .053 .76 .008
Conflict 23.51a .351 46 .92a .347 18.74a .300 3 6.35a .292 19.3a .307 37.06a .296
Sequence .29 .007 .29 .003 .40 .009 .72 .008 .12 .003 .22 .002
0 x C .16 .003 .29 .000 .11 .002 .21 .002 .03 .001 .40 .000
0 x S .91 .020 1 .00 .01 1 .92 .021 1 .01 .01 1 .94 .021 1 .62 .01 8
C x 5 .37 .008 .72 .008 1..14 .025 1 .94 .021 .66 .015 .76 .008
0 x C x S 1 .60 .035 .48 .005 .94 .021 .38 .004 .613 .014 .54 .006
Error 0""^ .1 32 1 .76 12.27 27. 89 3.78 9. 31
df = 2,87 df = 1 ,88
h-00CMIIa df = 1,88 df = 2,87 df = 1 ,88
a : £  c .001 a : £ < .001 a : , £  < . 001 a : •:. £ .001 a : £  <;. 001 a : £  <. 001




INTERVAL LEVEL DATA RESULT SUMMARY FOR 4 FACTOR 
REPEATED MEASURE ANALYSIS: SEQUENCE
AS A FACTOR
Judgment Judge/Explain Elkind
iLi_ F 1 -JL F 1 -Jl
Ob j e c t .00 .000 .00 .000 .76 .008
Conflict 46.90a .347 36.35a .292 37.06a .296
Sequence .29 .003 .72 .008 .22 .002
Memory Cue .07 .01 0 .85 .01 0 .64 .007
OxC .29 .003 .21 .002 .04 .000
0x5 1 .00 .01 1 1 .01 .01 1 1 .62 .01 8
OxM 2.81 b .003 2.37b .002 4.32b .046
Cx5 .72 .008 1 .94 .021 .76 .008
CxM .07 1 .52 .001 1 .25 .01 4
5xM .31 .09 .000 .03 .003
OxCxS .48 .005 .38 .004 .54 .006
OxSxM .87 .85 .000 .23
OxCxM .03 .00 .000 .03
CxSxM .03 .38 .000 .04
OxCxSxM 2.81 c 1 .52c .001 • 63c
Error ^
MxSubj ect .15 .879 .81
Within .88 13.95 4.66
df 1 ,88 1 ,88 1 , 88
a: £  ^ .001 .001 .001
b: £ < .10 .10 .10
c: £  ^ .10 .25 .50
1 1 8
the within groups generalized variance--the smaller is _A* . 
The reader is directed to Tatsouka (1971) for a compre­
hensive and comprehensible treatment of the Wilks likeli­
hood ratio.
The Wilks ratio is most generally defined as 
TV = Isej / 15h + Sej. 5e is the sums of squares and cross 
products matrix, SSCP, and j Se | is its determinant. Sh is 
the SSCP matrix for the effect being tested by a given null 
hypothesis and j Sh| is its determinant. |sh + 5e| is the 
determinant of the sum of the 5h and Se matrices. The deter­
minants are employed in the Manova case whereas in the Anova, 
Se is simply the proper error variation and Sh is the vari­
ation between the groups for the null hypothesis of interest. 
For example, in a 1-way Anova we would have TV = 55w/(SSw + 
SSb), where: 55w is the within groups variation, SSb is the
between groups variation and SSw + SSb is the total variation 
about the grand mean.
As TV is inversely related to the discriminability,
1 -TV is directly proportional to the disparity and indica­
tive of proportion variance accountable. The values of 1 - 
TV, where appreciable, for the null hypotheses in the vari­
ance analyses are also reported in Table 4.14 and Table 4.15.
The only significant effect in the Anova is on the 
Conflict factor, as the Imagery level yielded much higher 
scores than the Concrete level. There was not a hint of any 
other important effect and the results were consistent for 
all three criterion measures, but as indicated by 1 -
1 1 9
JTOT'was in absolute terms slightly the better discrimi­
nator.
The results for the Manova were very similar to those 
in Anova except that there was a near significant (jd <.10) 
Object effect for the Elkind criterion in the Manova. This 
effect washes out when the scores for the two Memory levels 
are combined (i.e., in the Anova) and is thus indicative of 
a possible Object x Memory interaction.
The RM analyses show: a marked effect for Conflict,
no differences for Object and, for the Elkind criterion only, 
a significant (£ < . 05) Object x Memory interaction. The 
interaction prompted a test for simple main effects and a 
significant difference (£<. 05) was found for Recall vs No 
Recall in the Within Object condition. This simple effect 
is summarized for each of the criteria in Table 4.16 and is 
diagrammed for the Elkind criterion in Figure 4.2. As can 
be seen from the diagram, the Recall tended to diminish per­
formance in the Within Object paradigms and was inconse­
quential in Between Object cases.
The hierarchy of difficulty among the paradigms was 
determined by ordered comparisons of the respective mean per­
formances. The Newman-Keuls (Winer, 1972) procedure was used 
and the results are presented in Table 4.17. Regardless of 
the criterion, the hierarchy of difficulty is CE = CIO ?  Cl = 
CEN. The Concrete paradigms are each significantly (£<..01) 
more difficult than the Imagery cases, but not different from 




OF RECALL CUE V5 NO RECALL CUE 
WITHIN OBJECT CONDITION
Judgment Judge/Explain Elkind
F 3.39 3.029 4.14
E .10 .1 00 .05
df
















ORDERED COMPARISONS OF THE CONSERVATION PARADIGM 
MEANS: NEWMAN-KEULS PROCEDURE
Judgment Criterion 
CE CIC Cl CEN
CE .083 .937* 1.000*
CIC .854* .91 7*
Cl .063
S • cl( -01 )* .382 .579 .623
Judge/Explain Criterion





S • ol( .01 )* 2.02 2.32 2.470
Elkind Criterion
CIC .208 1.83* 2.17*
CE 1 .63* 1 .96*
Cl .333
S • a.( .01 )* 1.170 1.33 1 .43
1 22
Perhaps the most notable fact is that for all the analyses 
with Sequence as a factor, the proportion of the effect plus 
error variation attributable to the Conflict hypothesis was 
upwards of .29.
Age as a Factor
The cells means for the twelve group design are pre­
sented in Table 4.18. The variance was analyzed by Manova 
and Anova techniques. An analysis of covariance via Anova 
was also performed using the pretest score as the covariate. 
The pretest was a check on the subjects' comprehensions of 
the verbal quantitative relations and was moderately corre­
lated (.291) with age. The above analyses were executed for 
each criterion, thus there are nine summaries— three for each 
criterion--reported in Table 4.19.
The Conflict again emerged as a strong main effect 
while Age was significant (£<.025) in Anova but only 
marginally so (£ <.10) in Manova. The Manova computer pro­
gram (OSIRIS) also performs univariate tests for each of the 
dependent variables. As was the case for the Sequence analy­
ses, the univariate tests of significance were highly con­
sistent with the results of the multivariate tests, except 
for the Elkind criterion Object effect. Also for each of the 
twelve groups, t_ tests —  using the error term calculated for 
correlated samples— between the cell means showed not one 
significant difference between the Recall and No Recall con­
ditions. As such _t tests are the least conservative, it was
TABLE 4.18
CELL MEANS FOR THE TWELVE GROUP 2 X 2 X 2 X 3 FACTORIAL 
DESIGN: AGE AS A FACTOR
Group Means
Covariates Judgment Judge/Explain Elkind
Paradigm 0 C A n Age flit R NR Total R NR Total R NR Total
1 1 1 7 58.29 5.1 43 0 . 0 0 0 0.1 42 0.1 42 0 . 0 0 0 0.286 0.286 1 .286 1 .71 4 3 .000
CIC 1 1 2 9 64.88 5.778 0.222 0.333 0.556 0.889 1.111 2.000 2.111 2.333 4.444
1 1 3 8 72.50 5.876 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 1 .625 1 .625 3.250
1 2 1 7 57.85 4.71 4 0.1 43 0.286 0.429 0.286 0.571 0.857 1 .571 2.000 3.571
Cl 1 2 2 1 0 65.70 5.800 0.900 1 .200 2.1 00 3.400 4.000 7.400 3.600 4.200 7.800
1 2 3 7 71 .85 6.000 1 .571 1 .714 3.285 5.714 6.286 12.000 4.857 5.429 10.286
2 1 1 9 58.33 5.889 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 1 .889 1 . 889 3.778
CE 2 1 2 8 64.62 5.250 0.125 0 . 0 0 0 0.125 0.250 0 . 0 0 0 0.250 2.250 1 .750 4.000
2 1 3 7 71 .71 5.857 0.1 49 0 . 0 0 0 0.149 0.571 0 . 0 0 0 0.571 2.429 2.000 4.429
2 2 1 6 58.80 5 .500 1 .000 1 .1 67 2.1 67 3.000 3.667 6.667 4.000 4.333 8.333
CEN 2 2 2 1 0 64.40 6.000 1 .000 0.900 1 .900 3.600 3 .200 6.800 3.900 3.400 7.300
2 2 3 8 72.25 6.000 1 .125 1 .1 25 2.250 4.000 4.250 8.250 4.1 25 4.375 8.500
Key of 5ymbols:
0 = Object: 1 = Within, 2 = Between
C = Conflict: 1 = Concrete, 2 = Image
A = Age level: 1 = young, 2 = mid, 3 = old
n = number of subjects in the group
R = Recall cue (2 tasks)
NR = No Recall cue (2 tasks)
Total = R + NR scores (4 tasks)
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TABLE 4.79
INTERVAL LEVEL DATA RESULT SUMMARY FDR 3 FACTOR 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE:
AGE AS A FACTOR
2 Dependent 1 Dependent 1 Dependent &.
variables variable 1 Covariate
F df £ 1 -JL F df £ 1 -JL F df £ 1 -Jl
0 1 .3 2, 83 .03 .002 1 ,84 .000 .000 1 , 83 .000
c 25.9 2,83 .005 .38 52.04 1 ,84 .00 5 .382 51 .56 1 , 83 .005 .383
A 1 .91 4, 1 66 . 10 .086 3.64 2, 84 .05 .079 3.49 2,83 .05 .077
OxC 0.15 2, 83 .004 .30 1 .84 .004 .34 1. ,83 .004
OxA 1.14 4, 166 .052 1 .92 2. 84 .25 .044 1 .92 2, 83 .25 .004
Cx A 1 .39 4,1 66 .064 2.87 2, 84 . 10 .063 2.88 2,83 . 10 .069
OxCxA 1.43 4,1 66 .065 2.79 2, 84 . 10 .062 2.77 2,83 .10 .062
E rror 
<72 1 .1 22 1 .525 1 .54
Judge/Expi;ain Criterion
0 1.16 2,83 .027 .00 1 , 84 .000 .00 1 , 83 .000
c 20 .06 2, 83 .005 .325 38.79 1 ,84 .005 . 31 6 32.28 1 , 83 .005 .31 5
A 2.03 4,166 . 10 .091 3.99 2, 84 .025 .087 3.48 2,83 .05 .077
OxC 0.11 2,83 .002 .19 1 ,84 .002 .19 1 , 83 .002
OxA 1 .05 4,166 .048 1 .46 2, 84 .25 .034 1.31 2,83 .031
CxA 1 . 67 4,166 .25 .076 3 .01 2,84 . 10 .070 2.90 2,83 . 1 0 .065
OxCxA 1 .1 B 4,166 .054 1 .98 2, B4 .25 .045 1.96 2,83 .25 .045
Error<r 2 1 1 .35 24.93 25.23
Elkind Criterion
0 2.48 2,83 . 10 . 110 .97 1 ,84 .011 .90 1 , 83 .01 1
c 21 .86 2,83 .005 .345 41.5 1 ,84 .005 .33140.93 1 , 83 .005 .333
A 2.26 4,166 . 10 .1 00 4.36 2, 84 .025 .094 3.73 2,83 .05 .082
OxC 2.26 2, B3 .001 .04 1 ,84 .000 .03 1 , 83 .000
OxA 1 .73 4,166 .25 .078 2.79 2, 84 . 10 .062 2.46 2,83 . 10 .055
CxA 1 .40 4,166 .25 .064 2.39 2, 84 .10 .054 2.31 2,83 . 10 .052
OxCx A 1 .46 4,166 .25 .067 2 .79 2, 84 . 10 .063 2.76 2,83 .10 .062
Error <f 2 3.29 7.94 8.04
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again evident that the Memory factor had no important role 
in the experiment. Consequently, the remainder of the 
results pertain to JTOT, JETOT and ETDT (the scores combined 
across the four trials).
Although the Conflict x Age interaction only reached 
the .10 level, the simple effects for Age at each level of 
Conflict were tested. As anticipated, scores were signifi­
cantly (r *  .005) higher for Old children in the Imagery con­
dition but there were no differences at the Concrete level 
(see Table 4.20). This effect was further explored by 
ordered comparisons of the performance means at each Age 
level for the Cl and CEN paradigms, as shown in Tables 4.21 
and 4.22, respectively. In Cl the Young children scored sig­
nificantly (j d <. 0 1 ) lower than the Mid and Old, and there 
were no differences between the upper two Age levels. The 
trend for Age in CEIM was not the same as it was in Cl as 
none of the differences between the Age levels reached .05. 
The nature of the Conflict x Age effects and the disparate 
trends for Cl and CEN in this regard can be observed in 
Figure 4.3.
The curious aspects of the disparate trends for Cl 
and CEN revolves around the rather high scores for the Young 
subjects in CEN. A possible rationale for this can be 
spawned by noting the relatively small sample size (n = 6) 
for the CEN-Young group and the rather superior performance 
of two of its members. One of these subjects (60 months) 







SIMPLE MAIN EFFECTS FOR AGE AT 
THE TWO LEVELS OF THE 
CONFLICT FACTOR
Judgment Judge/Explain Elkind
£  ££ it £  ££ E  £  ££ e
5.789 2,84 .005 6.12 2,84 .005 6.24 2,84.005
<1 2,84 <1 2,84 <1 2,84
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TABLE 4.21
ORDERED COMPARISONS OF MEAN PERFORMANCES 






1 1 .671 * 2.857*
2 1.186
S(cl .01 )* 1 .660 1 .890
S(£ .05)** 1.245 1 .496
Judge/Explain Criterion
1 6.543** 11 .143*
2 4.600
S(£L .01 )* 6.711 7.630
S(JSL .05)** 5.051 6.069
Elkind Criterion
1 4.22B* 6.71 5*
2 2.485
S(a  .01)* 3.789 4.310
S(s  .05)** 2.852 3.427
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TABLE 4.22
ORDERED COMPARISONS OF MEAN PERFORMANCES 








































































Fig. 4.3 Age x Conflict interaction: Overall and at each
level of the Object factor.
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correct responses. Given that the age ceiling for the Young 
level was 61 months (and the small sample), it is not unrea­
sonable to consider that the difference between Cl and CEN 
for the Young subjects may be due to a real sampling error—  
the probability of such was determined to be about .05.
The paradigm^ hierarchy at each Age level was also 
investigated. Table 4.23 shows the results of ordered com­
parisons of the paradigms for the Young subjects. For JTOT, 
and ETOT, CEN is significantly less difficult than the other 
paradigms, and there are no other differences of note. The 
CEN-Young performance has been previously cited as an anomaly 
and the significant difference laid to sampling error, that 
is, a type I error was in fact made.
The results for the paradigm comparisons at the Mid 
age are presented in Table 4.24. For all criteria, Cl and 
CEN are significantly (£<.05) less difficult than CE, and 
marginally so (jd <.10) for CIC. The comparisons for the Old 
children in Table 4.25 yield the hierarchy that has been pre­
viously found with the nominal and Sequence interval level 
data. That is, both Cl and CEN are less difficult than CIC 
and CE, and neither CIC-CE or CI-CEN are significantly dif­
ferent from each other. The decalage among the paradigms 
involves the Conflict, but not the Object, dimension.
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TABLE 4.23
ORDERED COMPARISONS OF MEAN PERFORMANCES IN THE FOUR 
CONSERVATION PARADIGMS FOR THE YOUNG CHILDREN
CE CIC Cl CEN
Judgment Criterion
CE .143 .429 2.167*
CIC .286 2.023*
Cl 1.738**
5(£.01 )* 1.660 1.890 2.030
5 (_g_. 05 ) ** 1.249 1.500 1 .650
Judge/Explain Criterion
CE .285 .8571 6.667**
CIC .571 4 6.381
Cl 5.809
S( cl-01 )* 6.710 7.6300 8.21 0
5(£. 05)** 5.050 6.0600 6.680
Elkind Criterion
CIC .571 .777 5.330*
Cl .206 4.760*
CE 4.550**
S(a .01 )* 3.780 4.310 4.630
5(a .05)** 2.850 3.420 3.770
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TABLE 4.23
ORDERED COMPARISONS OF MEAN PERFORMANCES IN THE FOUR 
CONSERVATION PARADIGMS FOR THE MIDDLE CHILDREN
CE CIC CEN Cl
Judgment Criterion
CE .430 1.77** 1.98**
CIC 1 .34 1 .54
CEN
S(_g.01 )* 1 .660 1 .89 2.08
5 ( c[. 05 ) ** 1 .249 1 .50 1.65
Judge/Explain Criterion
CE 1 .750 6.55** 7.15**
CIC 4.80 5.40
CEN
S (cl-01 )* 6.710 7.63 8.21
S(£.05)** 5 .050 6.05 5.40
Elkind Criterion
CE .444 3.40** 3.80**
CIC 2.86 3.35
CEN
S(£.01)* 3 .780 4.31 4.63
S(a .05)** 2.850 3.41 3.77
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TABLE 4.25
ORDERED COMPARISONS OF MEAN PERFORMANCES IN THE FOUR 
CONSERVATION PARADIGMS FOR THE OLD CHILDREN
CIC CE CEN Cl
Judgment Criterion
CIC .1 43 2.25* 3.285*
CE 2.1 1 * 3.140*
CEN 1 .030
5(a .01 )* 1 .660 1 .89 2.030
Stja.05)** 1 .249 1 .50 1 .650
Judge/Explain Crit erion
CIC .571 8.25* 12.000*
CE 7.67* 11.420*
CEN 3. 750
S(£.01)* 6.710 7.63 8.210
5 (jg. 05 ) ** 5.050 6.06 6.680
Elkind Criterion
CIC 1.17 5.25* 7.030*
CE 4.08** 6.280*
CEN 2.350
S(a .D1 )* 3.7B 4.31 4.630
5(£.05)** 2.85 3.42 3.770
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Fortuity of Group Performances
A distinct benefit of constructing fortuitous models 
is that the performance of an individual or a group can be 
objectively categorized as being due to inherent chance 
factors or not. In the present study an individual's classi­
fication as pass or fail was based upon the probability that 
their score was of the null or fortuitous population of 
scores. Similarly a group performance can be so evaluated, 
either by a goodness of fit test of observed vs expected 
frequencies/probabilities or by determining the probability 
that a given sample mean came from the null population. For 
this study the latter technique was selected, primarily due 
to the sometimes limited sample size for certain of the 
groups of interest and also because it is just as rigorous 
as the former but can be implemented with a good deal more 
facility.
The normal standard deviates and respective signifi­
cance levels for the paradigms and, at each Age level, the 
intra-paradigm groups are shown in Table 4.26. A sample cal­
culation for the Old children in Cl under the Elkind criterion 
is given below. From Table 3.7, the mean and variance of 
the null distribution are 7.365 and 5.902, respectively.
From Table 4.18 the group mean and size are, respectively, 
10.286 and 7. The standard error of the mean is \45.902/7 = 
.918 and the resultant z_ score is, (10.286 - 7.365)/.91 8 = 
3.18. The null hypothesis is rejected (ja <.001), and it is




SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL5 OF GROUP PERFORMANCES FOR THE 
CONSERVATION PARADIGMS: OVERALL AND AT EACH
AGE LEVEL
Judgment Elkind
Paradigm Age n x Z P x Z P
1 7 .377 -4.93 .001 .918 -4.75 .001
CIC 2 9 .333 -4.34 .001 .809 -3.67 .001
3 B .353 -5.66 .001 .737 -5.58 .001
1 9 .333 -6.00 .001 .809 -4.44 .001
CE 2 8 .353 -5 .31 .001 .737 -4.56 .001
3 7 .3 77 -4.91 .001 .91 8 -3.19 .001
1 7 .377 -4.16 .001 .918 -4.13 .001
Cl 2 1 0 .31 6 .32 .3 70 .591 .74 .230
3 7 .377 3 .40 .001 .91 8 3.18 .001
1 6 .408 .41 .340 .991 .97 .1 70
CEN 2 1 0 .31 6 -.32 .370 .591 - . 1 1 .460
3 8 .353 .71 .240 .737 1 .54 .060
Paradigm
CIC 24 .204 -8.57 .001 .495 -7.55 .001
CE 24 .204 -9.39 .001 .495 -6.72 .001
Cl 24 .204 -.25 .400 .495 -.15 .450
CEN 24 .204 .39 .350 .495 1.19 .1 20
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Inspection of Table 4.26 shows that all performances 
in Concrete Conflict paradigms were significantly (jd.^.05) 
worse than fortuitous, whereas only a single Imagery mean 
(CI-Young) was significantly below the chance level. The 
Old subjects in both Cl and CEIM can be said to have exceeded 
a fortuitous score while the probabilities for the CEN-Young 
and Cl, CEN-Mid groups indicate an apparent transitional 
stage which is neither below or above fortuity. The proba­
bilities for overall performances in each paradigm imply that 
for the age range explored, CIC and CE are significantly 
below fortuity, Cl and CEN are likely fortuitous, and the 
hierarchy of fortuitousness, i.e., difficulty, is CIC =
CE ^  Cl = CEN.
Convergence of Scoring Criteria and 
Statistical Analyses
Nominal Level Data
The three criteria yielded largely comparable results 
and the number of subjects passed under each of them was 
consistent with the respective fortuitous significance levels. 
JETOT (jd<.06) was the most stringent criterion and yielded 
16 passes, JTOT (£.4.. 06) was next with 17 passes and ETOT 
.12) was the most permissive and netted 20 passes. 
Transitivity was evidenced as there were no instances where 
a subject who passed a more stringent criterion failed to 
pass one less stringent.
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The above results are interpreted as being con­
sistent with expectations, though it could be somewhat sur­
prising that the difference between JTOT and JETOT was not 
greater. The acceptable explanations were the same for all 
the paradigms,and doubtless the rigor of a given explanation 
should be conceived of as a function of the paradigm obsta­
cles. For example, in Cl an explanation like, "it's the 
same stuff so it's the same amount," though quite acceptable 
in this study, is far less rigorous than if it were given in 
CIC. This is reasonable because in Cl the implication of 
same amount from same stuff is not challenged as it is in 
CIC since there is no hard percept to contradict the identity. 
There was only one subject who passed a Concrete Conflict 
task, and it is suggested that the lack of variation between 
JTOT and JETOT is due to the facility with which identity­
like arguments did suffice— for the child. It is likely that 
all the subjects who made correct judgments had available, 
and were content with, at least the perceptually-based identity 
argument. In the presence of the hard conflict the child, 
when inclined to give correct judgments on the intuitive 
level, would be not so easily disposed to offer the less- 
exacting identity explanations, thus making this argument 
more rigorous in the face of the percept. Had the identity 
argument been disallowed and only those alluding to I/R or 
the difference in heights as moot accepted, JETOT would have 
had only B passes. Ordinarily in the standard paradigm (CE)
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the JETOT criterion successes are found to be a proper sub­
set of JTOT successes (Gruen, 1 965; Brainerd, 1971 ; Rodin &. 
Gruen, 1970). Perhaps this is due in part to the reason 
cited above.
Interval Level Data
The Wilks likelihood ratio was adopted as a general 
means of establishing a distribution-free indication of the 
discriminability of the various effects. For each criterion 
the 1 - J\~ values for seven of the effects were factor
analyzed to determine the correspondences among the scoring 
procedures and the analyses of variance performed on the 
resultant data. The factor analyses were done separately for 
the Sequence and the Age as factors designs.
With the Sequence design there were nine different 
analyses of variance; three for each of the criterion. The 
seven main and interaction effects (Memory was not considered) 
were treated as the entities,and the specific analysis of 
variance technique was considered a variable. This yielded 
a seven-row by nine-column matrix. No correlation between 
the variables was less than .98 and the principal components 
solution showed only a single factor which accounted for 
about 99 percent of the variability. The key to the vari­
ables, correlation matrix and factor matrix, are presented 
in the Appendix in Tables 3, 4, and 5, respectively.
Six different analyses of variance were performed for 
the Age design, two for each criterion. A seven-row by six-
column raw data matrix was reduced to a six-by-six correla­
tion matrix and factor analyzed. The lowest correlation was 
.936 and the first component accounted for 98.3 percent of 
the variability. The key to the variables, correlation 
matrix and factor matrix, are shown in the Appendix in Tables 
6, 7, and 8, respectively.
These findings require little elaboration as it is 
clear that the three scoring criteria, however analyzed, 




DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Introduction
As the results were voluminous, though largely self- 
descriptive, the summary and discussion below are presented 
in the interest of coherence and with the recognition of 
subterfuge as a wholly damnable art. Regarding the funda­
mental hypotheses of the study, the various separate analyses 
of the raw data afforded no uninterpretable surprises and led 
to the same set of conclusions. Although it does not provide 
fertile ground for any considerable rhetoric, the state of 
the results is not to be deplored and in itself may be a most 
salient aspect of the study. At any rate, the discussion of 
results will be brief. But before proceeding to a synthesis 
of hopefully sound implication, it would be helpful to give 
a succinct and explicit summary of the results most pertinent 
to the decalage hypothesis.
Summary of Results
Of the five independent variables to which group dif­
ferences could be attributed, only the Conflict factor and 
Age factor were of import and, in the final distillation, 
their effect was essentially of an interactive nature. That 
is, the most important differential performance between the
Imagery and Concrete levels was for the Middle and Old chil­
dren. At the former Age level, CEN and Cl were markedly 
(jd 4.05) less difficult than CE and only moderately (ja <.10) 
easier than CIC. But for the Old children the two Imagery 
paradigms were significantly easier than CE or CIC, and the 
hierarchy unambiguously established as CE = CIC >  Cl = CEN. 
Also, at considerably higher statistical power, precisely 
this hierarchy was found (ja <.01) for the overall paradigm 
means.
In Concrete Conflict paradigms a child's age was of 
no consequence— all groups performed significantly below the 
fortuitous level, and there were no important differences 
between intra-paradigm Age levels or between intra-Age level 
paradigms. The Middle and Old children did better than the 
Young on the Cl problems and not differently from each other, 
but there was no apparent trend for Age in CEN, primarily 
because the Young children scored inordinately high in CEN.
The Old children performed significantly beyond the fortuitous 
level in Cl and CEN, with the strongest performance being in 
the former paradigm. The overall scores in the respective 
paradigms showed performance to be well below chance levels 
in CE and .CIC but clearly within fortuitous expectations for 
Cl and CEN.
The Sequence, Memory, and Object factors were of no 
general consequence in the experiment. There was some indi­
cation that the Recall cue for Within Object tasks tended to 
attenuate scores, as it should since in these paradigms it
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can cause the child to reflect on the initial configuration. 
The debilitating effect of the Recall cue was noticeable—  
though not statistically significant— in Cl where there was 
substantial variation. In CIC, subjects uniformly made 
incorrect judgments because of the concrete percept. It was 
expected that the Recall would aid solution to the Between 
Object problems--especially if a transitivity argument is 
employed--and be detrimental for Within Object tasks, since 
there it would further alert the child to the original con­
figuration. The former enhancement was not at all realized 
and the latter expectation was only somewhat the case.
The judgment, judge/explain, Elkind criteria and 
the measurement level of the data did not make any sub­
stantive difference in the conclusions permitted by the 
results. Theoretically, more information is accrued at the 
interval level than at the nominal level, and the para­
metric techniques are more powerful in teasing out statis- 
tically-significant differences. The superior power of the 
interval data was in evidence, but no decisions that were 
logically permissible at this higher level of measurement 
were contradictory to those made at the lower level. Also, 
within a level of measurement, each of the criteria yielded 
consistent results and, except for occasional small differ­
ences in power, the decisions regarding effects were the 
dame.
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The Status of the Identity 
Equivalence Decalage
It is doubtless that there exists a decalage between 
Cl and CE, and that Cl is developmentally prior to CE--this 
much of Elkind's formulation was not contested. The com­
ponent of CE largely responsible for the decalage is not based 
in the number of stimulus objects, but instead upon the con­
crete perceptual disparity of the altered and unaltered 
objects, which irresistably suggests to pre-operational 
children that there is also no quantitative equivalence.
When the differential configuration is concrete for a single 
object conservation task (CIC), the pre-operational subject 
is just as impelled by the appearance of inequality as in the 
Between Object task (CE). Likewise, in the Between paradigm 
where the perceptual disparity is not directly visible but 
left to imagery (CEN), the subjects performed as well as in 
the Within-Imagery paradigm (Cl).
The Elkind hypothesis is diminished, though not viti­
ated entirely, by the above findings. It should be accepted 
that TGE is correct in its assumption, rejected by Elkind 
(1967), that identity and equivalence conservation are simul­
taneous in development. Of course, in the implicit equation 
of identity and equivalence conservation, Piaget must have 
assumed that the crucial components in the problem are also 
equated. Elkind's definition and subsequent labeling of the 
decalage issue is seen to be spurious since identity para­
digms are not easier than equivalence paradigms. The decalage
should be analyzed in terms of the relative concreteness of 
the antagonistic perceptual data, the number of stimulus 
objects apparently not withstanding. The relative concrete­
ness of the configurative differences is tantamount to the 
degree of counter suggestion to the logically correct con­
clusion. If the difference in configuration is left to a 
remembered image, then the suggestion contrary to equal 
amounts is of doubtful presence. On the other hand, if the 
perceptual discrepancy is concrete, its impact is both con­
trolled and maximal. In passing, it should be emphasized that 
it does not necessarily follow that incremental concreteness 
or incremental differences in the perceptual discrepancy will 
lead to a decrement in solution for a given age group. That 
is, the relationship between concreteness of percept and 
solution is not expected to be a monotonic or continuous 
function.
Some Concluding Observations
The relative ordinal weights of the paradigm obstacles 
— Conflict, Object, Memory— defined in Section II.5 are vindi­
cated by the results. The Memory and Object factors were of 
little consequence in discriminating between group performances 
—  in all cases 1 - _/V<. 01 . The only instance where either of 
these factors were implicated by differences was in an Object 
by Memory interaction for the Elkind criterion, but even this 
was only interpretable in terms of the Conflict. The Recall 
cue did not enhance performance in the equivalence paradigms
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but it did diminish scores in identity paradigms where in 
fact the cue calls attention to the configurative disparency 
of the object states, thus increasing the likelihood of a 
remembered image and a cognitive conflict.
The resultant net ranking indicated for across 
obstacles was, Conflict >  Object = Memory, while the diffi­
culty weights for intra-obstacle levels was Concrete > 
Imagery, Within = Between, Recall = No Recall (inequivalence), 
Recall 2 No Recall (in identity). These ordinal weights are 
not strictly amenable to inferences beyond the age range 
sampled in the study and are most applicable to the Middle 
(5 years, 5 months) and Old (6 years) Age levels. For 
example, perhaps older, more conservation-sophisticated 
children would rely on a transitivity solution to CE, in 
which case the Recall cue could be of some benefit.
In that the Genevans are well aware of the CI-CE 
decalage, and doubtless of its source, the results of this 
study are of rather scant importance to TGE and its serious 
practitioners. This dissertation, as expected, leaves TGE 
invariant and simply points out those aspects of the conser­
vation paradigms which contribute to variation in solution 
behavior among children who have not yet developed the requi­
site structure.
As discussed in Section II, Cl has a multiplicity of 
possible solution modes, many of which are irrelevant to TGE, 
reversibility and concrete operations. A remembered percept 
could be sufficient to provoke a conflict in Cl or CEN, but
there is no readily apparent method to ascertain that a child 
is sufficiently cognizant of the configurative differences.
To define the conflict as sufficient on the basis of an 
incorrect response would be to carry operationalism to perhaps 
its most absurd logical end. The Imagery paradigms are ill 
conceived for assessment of concrete operations and, as there 
are numerous possible interpretations of the meaning of a 
correct response, their utility for any current theoretical 
position is likely to be persistently equivocal.
CIC is developmentally equivalent to CE and both of 
these paradigms are more difficult than Cl and CEN. As the 
latter pair of paradigms do not include the concrete percept 
obstacle and T5 does not directly account for the perceptual 
disparity in CE, the Cl + TS = CE model is inadequate. Upon 
observing the concrete perceptual disparity in CIC, a child 
who can deal with Cl would not be necessarily expected to 
succeed in CIC,and likewise for CE. But it could be that a 
scheme of the form, CIC + 0 = CE is tenable. CIC includes 
the concrete percept of CE but lacks its multiple stimuli 
aspect. The mental operation(s) necessary to compensate for 
the latter obstacle in the CE paradigm is represented by 0 
and could be the transitivity-syllogism proposed by Elkind 
(1967). However, the evidence accumulated here indicates 
that the set of successes in CE that are a proper subset of 
CIC is the empty or null set, i.e., CIC = CE and no opera­
tions developmentally beyond CIC are required to solve CE.
On the other hand the lack of a CIC-CE decalage could be an
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artifact of the ages sampled in the study. All the subjects, 
except one, failed the Concrete Conflict paradigms. Per­
haps a decalage does exist for children further into the con­
crete operational period.
A normative interpretation of the results must obtain 
that CIC and CE are simultaneous in development, but this in 
no way precludes that CIC + TS, or even Cl + T5, can afford 
solutions to CE. One avenue to the assessment of 0 would be 
to instruct pre-operational subjects in CIC and some other 
task where success is postulated to be a behavioral conse­
quence of the operation 0 , and then observe if there is a 
solution to CE where previously there was none. A direct 
training method like the above might be objectionable on the 
grounds that, increments in performance would primarily be 
indicative of response transfer, and not of a rigorous devel­
opment of the notion of conservation. This is a valid and 
insufficiently voiced objection, but with proper experimental 
and statistical controls for the detection of simple transfer 
of responses— a variation on fortuitous performance— some 
useful information could be derived from direct training 
approaches. At any rate it seems apparent that, in lieu of 
replication efforts, additional indirect studies such as the 
present one cannot resolve the immanence of 0 .
•]
a) The configurative disparity (B vs B*) may have 
been sufficiently attended to or b) a nonrigorous conclusion 
of B = B*, plus TS, could be a way of deducing that the con- 










An object employed in conservation paradigms which 
remains in an unaltered state throughout the task. 
Univariate (dependent) analysis of variance.
An object employed in conservation paradigms which 
is altered in configuration during the task.
An object in the conservation paradigms which results 
from the configurative alteration of object B during 
the task.
A direct comparison task where the subject is required 
to judge the ordinal relationship of amount for 
material in two cylindrical containers. The amounts 
are equal and the diameters of the two containerscan 
be identical or different.
A direct comparison task where the subject is 
required to judge the ordinal relationship of amount 
for material in two cylindrical containers of differ­
ent diameters. The heights of material in each con­
tainer are equal, thus the amounts are different.
A two-object (equivalence) conservation paradigm 
where the unaltered object, that is compared with 
the altered object, can be directly perceived through­
out the task.
A two-object (equivalence) conservation paradigm 
where the unaltered object, that is compared with
the altered object, cannot be directly perceived 
once the initial equality of the two objects has 
been established prior to the alteration of one of 
them.
A single-object (identity) conservation paradigm 
where there is no concrete percept of the initial 
configuration of the object after its configuration 
alteration.
A single-object (identity) conservation paradigm 
where there is a concrete percept of the initial 
configuration of the object after its configuration 
alteration.
Conservation of continuous quantity. The object is 
a fluid which is contained in a cylindrical trans­
parent beaker.
Conservation of discontinuous quantity. The object 
is a mass of numerous small elements (e.g., beads) 
which are contained in a cylindrical transparent 
beaker.
The identity transformation element of an algebraic 
Group. the operation of identity upon any element 
of the Group leaves it saliently unaltered. 
Identity-Reversibility concrete logical operations 
postulated by Piaget to account for the quantita­
tive conservations developed during the concrete 
operational period.
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Wilks' likelihood ratio criterion; error variation/ 
(error + hypothesis) variation.
Multivariate (dependent) analysis of variance.
A mental operation that can take any definition, 
i.e., a variable.
Repeated measures univariate analysis of variance. 
General theory of genetic epistemology, after J.
Piaget.
Transitivity-Syllogistic deductive ability postulated 
by David Elkind to ultimately account for the quanti­
tative conservations of the concrete operational 
period.
Equivalence
conservation A between objects conservation paradigm, employ­
ing two distinct objects, in which one of them under­
goes a configurative alteration and where the crucial 
quantitative comparison is between the altered object 
and the unaltered object.
Group An abstract algebraic structure or set of elements 
which has a rule of combination for elements that 
invariably yields an element of the set, and exhibits 
the properties of associativity, identity, and 
reversibility (inverse).
Identity
conservation A within object conservation paradigm employing 
only a single object which undergoes a configurative 
alteration and where the crucial quantitative com­
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DESCRIPTION AND COLUMN LAYOUT OF RAW DATA
Description
Subject number
CQ in Recall score, judgment 
DQ in Recall score, judgment 
Subtotal score in Recall, judgment 
CQ in No Recall score, judgment
DQ in No Recall score, judgment
Subtotal Score in No Recall, judgment 
Total score on judgment (JTOT)
CQ in Recall score, judge/explain 
DQ in Recall score, judge/explain 
Subtotal score in Recall, judge/explain 
CQ in No Recall score, judge/explain
DQ in No Recall score, judge/explain
Subtotal score in No Recall, judge/explain 
Total score on judge/explain (JETOT)
Subtotal score in Recall, Elkind 
Subtotal score in No Recall, Elkind 
Total score on Elkind (ETOT)
Pretest score 
Age in months 
Sex, 1 = female, 2 = male
Sample source, 1 = Ferland, 1 = Durham, 3 = New­
market
Object factor, 1 = Within, 2 = Between
Conflict factor, 1 = Concrete, 2 = Imagery
Sequence factor, 1 = Recall first, 2 = Recall second
Paradigm designation, 1 = Cl, 2 = CEN, 3 = CIC,
4 = CE
Age factor, 1 = Young, 2 = Middle, 3 = Old 





















































































0000000 000000 0 22 466311 21 1 4
0000000 000000 0 22 466821 21 1 4
0000000 000000 0 22 466221 21 24
0000000 000000 0 1 1 226211 21 24
0000000 000000 0 22 466111 21 14
0000000 000000 0 22 465721 211 4
0000000 000000 0 22 467221 21 24
0000000 000000 0 1 1 266011 1 211
0000000 000000 0 22 465821 121 1
0000000 000000 0 22 446121 1113
0000000 000000 0 1 1 267221 1113
1121124 4484481 6 661266811 1 21 1
0000000 000000 0 22 466411 1 1 23
1121124 44844816 661 26731 1 1 221
0000000 000000 0 22 457321 1 123
0000000 000000 0 22 466211 1113
0000000 000000 0 22 467211 1113
0000000 000000 0 1 1 246121 1 123
0000000 000000 0 22 467121 1 123
1120002 224000 4 62 867311 121 1
1121124 44844816 661266411 1 221
1121124 44844816 661266421 1 221
1121124 44844816 661267221 1 221
0000000 000000 0 22 467111 221 2
1 01 1 1 23 202224 6 36 956121 221 2
0000000 000000 0 22 467421 221 2
1 01 1 1 23 202224 6 63 966221 2222
1121124 44844816 661267321 2222
0110001 022000 2 32 567311 221 2
1120113 44804412 651166411 2222
1121124 44844816 661266811 2222
0110001 044000 4 52 766911 21 1 4
0000000 000000 0 22 467311 211 4
0000000 000000 0 22 466021 21 1 4
0000000 000000 0 22 467411 21 24
0000000 000000 0 22 456011 21 24
0000000 000000 0 22 456511 2124
0000000 000000 0 22 466221 21 24
01 1 1 123 □4444812 3 6 967211 1211
1121124 44844816 661266321 1211
1 58
11 21 31 41
41 □001011 000202 2 25 735421 1 21 1 1 1
42 01 1 0001 022000 2 31 465911 1 221 32
43 0001122 000224 4 1 6 766921 1 221 32
44 0000000 000000 0 22 466711 1113 21
45 1121124 44844B16 661266421 1113 21
46 0000000 000000 !0 1 1 266421 221 2 21
47 0000000 000000 0 22 465321 1113 1 1
48 0000000 000000 0 1 1 266421 1 123 21
49 0000111 000022 2 1 3 466521 1 1 23 22
50 0001011 000202 2 1 3 466011 1 1 23 1 1
51 1 1 201 1 3 224022 6 641055011 221 2 1 1
52 0000000 000000 0 1 1 266411 2222 21
53 0000000 000000 0 22 466413 2222 21
54 0000000 000000 0 1 1 267022 1113 32
55 0000000 000000 0 22 4661 1 2 21 24 1 1
56 1121124 4484481 6 661267322 221 2 32
57 1121124 44844816 661267522 2222 32
58 0000000 000000 0 21 366822 21 1 4 22
59 0000000 000000 0 22 4661 1 2 2222 1 1
60 0000000 000000 0 1 1 266923 1113 32
61 0000000 000000 0 22 467323 1 1 23 32
62 1121124 44344816 661267023 1 21 1 32
63 0000000 000000 0 22 466613 221 2 22
64 1121124 44844816 661266513 2222 22
65 0000000 000000 0 22 466813 1 221 22
6 6 0000000 000000 0 22 467323 21 1 4 32
67 1121124 4484481 6 661 266323 2222 21
68 0000000 000000 0 1 1 255613 1 221 1 1
69 0110001 022000 2 32 566423 221 2 21
70 0000000 000000 0 1 1 255813 1 221 1 1
71 1010001 202000 2 52 736723 21 24 22
72 0000000 000000 0 22 465523 21 24 1 1
73 0000000 000000 0 1 1 265723 21 1 4 1 1
74 0000000 000000 0 1 1 266023 1 123 1 1
75 0000000 000000 0 1 1 256713 1 221 22
76 0000000 000000 0 22 467213 21 1 4 32
77 0000000 000000 0 22 466023 2124 1 1
78 0000111 000022 2 1 3 426023 1 21 1 1 1
79 0001122 000224 4 1 6 756713 121 1 22
80 0000000 000000 0 1 1 266523 121 1 22
1 59
11 21 31 41
81 1121124 44844816 661256013 221 2 1 1
82 0001011 000202 2 25 767023 2222 32
83 0000000 000000 0 1 1 246623 1 1 23 22
84 01 1 1 1 23 022224 6 561166413 1211 21
85 1121124 44844816 661267413 1 221 32
86 0000000 000000 0 22 468013 1 1 23 32
87 0000000 000000 0 22 466723 1 221 22
88 0000000 000000 0 22 466623 1 1 23 22
89 0000000 000000 0 22 465413 21 14 1 1
90 0000000 000000 0 22 456923 21 24 32
91 0000000 000000 0 1 1 245523 '1113 1 1
92 1011123 40444812 561166113 2222 1 1
93 1121124 42644814 661266923 221 2 32
94 0000000 000000 0 22 466623 1113 22
95 0000000 000000 0 1 2 365823 1113 1 1
96 0000000 000000 0 22 466013 2212 1 1
1 60
TABLE A.3
KEY TO VARIABLES FOR THE CONVERGENCE













CORRELATION MATRIX FOR CONVERGENCE 
ANALY5I5: SEQUENCE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 .998
3 .998 .997
4 .994 .990 .994
5 .996 .996 .997 .997
6 .986 .983 .990 .993 .993
7 1 .000 .998 .998 .994 .996 . 9B6
8 .998 1 .000 .997 .990 .996 .983 .998
9 .998 .997 1 .000 .994 .997 .990 .998 .997
1 62
TABLE A.5














KEY TO VARIABLES FOR THE CONVERGENCE 









CORRELATION MATRIX FOR CONVERGENCE 
ANALYSIS: AGE
1 2 3 4 5
2 .995
3 .994 .991
4 .997 .991 .994
5 .994 .996 .993 .996
6 .944 .936 .951 .966 .960
TABLE A .B


















TRANSCRIPT DF EXPLANATIONS AND ACCEPTABLE/UNACCEPTABLE
5TATU5 AS RATED BY JUDGES A AND B
S No. Judgmentscorrect Description
Status* 
A B
1 2 4 It's the same water and then 
it's the same amount.
1 4 4 Same amount still because the 
tall glass is skinnier.
21 4 Don't really know why but it 
would be different if you added 
some.
22 4 Glass is bigger but it's 
skinnier too.
23 4 You didn't add any stuff— the 
other glass is just taller.
25 3 I don't know. X X
27 3 It just is. X X
28 4 It's the same green water about 
as high; it's lower because 
it's fatter.
30 3 Same water, so same amount too. 
Other glass is skinnier.
31 4 Only the glass is bigger, it's 
skinnier.
39 3 The glass is different but the 
water is the same.
40 4 5ame water but different glass.
43 2 I don't know. X X
45 4 You just poured the same water. 
You didn't add any.
51 3 X X
56 4 Only poured it from one to 
another, still the same amount 
in the two cups.
1 66
57 4 Just one glass to the other, 
none spilled.
67 4 Just a bigger glass but same 
amount to drink.
62 4 You just dumped it all.
64 4 It just looks different.
79 2 I just don't know why. X X
92 3 It's only fuller. X
93 4 Only glasses are different. 
I just think so. X X
84 3 Because, I don't know. X X
05 4 Still same, just fatter 
that's all.
81 4 Same as before, you just 
poured it.
*x = unacceptable
